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FOREWORD
The political situation within Yemen has catapulted
to the top tier of U.S. national security concerns over
the last several years as it has become more directly
linked to both the problem of international terrorism
and the need for future stability in the Arabian Peninsula. On the terrorism front, the December 25, 2009,
attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in
Detroit, Michigan, by an individual trained by Yemeni
terrorists was a particularly clear warning to the United States about the dangers of neglecting this geopolitically important country. Yet, this near catastrophe
also underscored the need for a careful consideration
of U.S. policies regarding Yemen. This requirement
may be especially clear when one considers the chain
of events that might have been set off had there been
a successful terrorist strike in Detroit in which hundreds of Americans were killed. Apart from the human cost of such a tragedy, the U.S. leadership would
have been under enormous pressure to respond in a
way consistent with the level of public outrage associated with the event. Public pressure might well have
existed for military intervention in Yemen with U.S.
ground combat troops. Such an intervention is something that the present work insists would infuriate virtually the entire Yemeni population, regardless of the
objective merits of the U.S. case for the offensive use of
U.S. ground combat forces.
In approaching this analysis, Dr. W. Andrew
Terrill quotes then Central Command Commander
General David Petraeus in an April 2009 statement that
the al-Qaeda threat across the Middle East is weakening except in Yemen. In Yemen, the threat still seems
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to be growing well over a year following this prescient
observation. Additionally, while the terrorism threat
alone requires an intensive U.S. interest in Yemen, it
is not the only reason why an understanding of current Yemeni issues is important for the U.S. national
interest. An intermittent insurgency by Zaydi rebels
in northern Yemen and an expanding secessionist
movement in southern Yemen are also serious problems which may have important implications for the
wider Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, while these
problems are straightforward, their solutions are not.
Dr. Terrill also points out how deeply distrustful most
Yemenis are of any foreign military presence on their
soil and how quickly clerical leadership in Yemen will
characterize any U.S. bases in Yemen as colonialism,
which the population is required to resist by their religion. The U.S. challenge is therefore to help Yemen
destroy al-Qaeda without deploying large numbers
of U.S. troops in that country, while encouraging a
peaceful and lasting resolution of the government’s
problems with the northern Zaydi tribesmen and the
“Southern Movement,” which calls for an independent state in the south. All important U.S. policies on
Yemen will have to be coordinated with Saudi Arabia,
which is Yemen’s largest aid donor and plays a major
role in Yemen’s politics.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national
security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems
associated with the future of the Middle East and
the ongoing struggle against al-Qaeda. This analysis
should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders
and intelligence professionals as they seek to address
the complicated interplay of factors related to regional
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security issues, fighting terrorism, and the support of
local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking a
greater understanding of long-range issues of Middle
Eastern and global security. It is hoped that this work
will be of benefit to officers of all services, as well as
other U.S. Government officials involved in military
and security assistance planning.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is experiencing huge political and economic problems
that can have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the
region. It has a rapidly expanding population with a
resource base that is limited and already leaves much
of the current population in poverty. The government
obtains around a third of its budget revenue from
sales of its limited and declining oil stocks, which
most economists state will be exhausted by 2017. Yemen has critical water shortages aggravated by the
use of extensive amounts of water and agricultural
land for production of the shrub qat, which is chewed
for stimulant and other effects but has no nutritional
value. All of these problems are especially difficult to
address because the central government has only limited capacity to extend its influence into tribal areas
beyond the capital and major cities. Adding to these
difficulties, Yemen is also facing a variety of interrelated national security problems that have strained the
limited resources of the government, military, and security forces. In Sa’ada province in Yemen’s northern
mountainous region, there has been an intermittent
rebellion by Houthi tribesmen who accuse the government of discrimination and other actions against
their Zaydi Shi’ite religious sect. In southern Yemen,
a powerful independence movement has developed
which is mostly nonviolent but is also deeply angry
and increasingly confrontational.
A key country that must be considered in formulating Yemen policy is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is
Yemen’s chief aid donor and often considers itself to
have a special relationship with Yemen that affords
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it an elevated and privileged role in providing external guidance to Sana’a. Some observers suggest that
Saudi Arabia views this role as so important that challenging Saudi interests in Yemen is sometimes viewed
as equally offensive as interfering in Saudi domestic
politics. Riyadh has become especially sensitive about
Yemen issues in recent years and even intervened
militarily on the side of the Yemeni government in the
most recent phase of the Houthi war in Sa’ada province. The Saudis are also deeply involved with Yemen
in the struggle against al-Qaeda due in part to a 2009
merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of this organization. The merger occurred following the decision
of Saudi al-Qaeda members to flee to Yemen to rebuild
their battered organization. Saudi Arabia’s special relationship with Yemen can both help and hinder U.S.
objectives for that country.
Additionally, Yemen’s government has waged a
struggle against al-Qaeda with vacillating levels of intensity since at least 2001 when its leadership chose to
cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism
concerns in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
strikes. More recently, Yemen has emerged as one of
the most important theaters for the struggle against alQaeda, as many members of this organization attempt
to regroup and reorganize themselves in Yemen after
suffering crippling setbacks in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The loss of Yemen to al-Qaeda
would be particularly damaging to Western interests
due to its strategic location and a population which is
expected to exceed half of that of the entire Arabian
Peninsula within the next 20 years. Moreover, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered
in Yemen, appears to be strengthening and showing
signs of transitioning from a terrorist group with limited capabilities to an emerging insurgent movement.
x

Yemen is also an especially distrustful and wary
nation in its relationship with Western nations, and
particularly the United States. Most Yemenis are
fiercely protective of their country’s independence
from outside influence, especially from countries that
they believe do not always have the best interests
of the Arab World in mind. While Yemen’s government is coming to understand the dangers it faces
from al-Qaeda, the struggle against this organization
is not always popular among the Yemeni public, and
any large-scale U.S. military presence in the country
could easily ignite these passions and destabilize the
regime. Under such circumstances, it is important to
help Yemen, but to do so in ways that are not viewed
as intrusive or dominating by a population that does
not always identify with U.S. concerns about international terrorism. In recent years, U.S. policymakers
have managed to maintain this balance, but the complexities of Yemeni domestic politics will continue to
require subtlety and nimbleness in U.S.-Yemeni security relations.
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THE CONFLICTS IN YEMEN
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
As President, I have made it a priority to strengthen
our partnership with the Yemeni government—training and equipping their security forces, sharing intelligence, and working with them to strike al-Qaeda
terrorists.
President Barack Obama,
January 20101
Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the Arabian
Peninsula. The inability of the Yemeni government to
secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, particularly al-Qaeda, a safe haven from which to plan,
organize, and support terrorist operations.
General David Petraeus,
April 20092
As soon as the [United States] comes down into our
land and comes to colonize us, jihad is obligatory according to our religion.
Sheikh Abdul Majeed Zindani,
leading Yemeni cleric, January 20103

INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently deeply concerned
with the need to contain and defeat al-Qaeda forces in
Yemen. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to formulate a meaningful strategy to meet this objective without carefully considering a variety of other important
factors which have come to dominate Yemeni politics.
These factors include a crippled and declining econo1

my, as well as recurring problems with national unity.
Currently, Yemen faces simmering unrest in the north
that sometimes leads to revolt among Houthi tribesmen and a strong but mostly nonviolent secessionist
movement in the south. Under these conditions, U.S.
policy must be informed by a deep understanding of
both Yemen’s domestic politics and current Yemeni
government capacity to enforce its laws and maintain
internal security. U.S. policy formulations must also
be based on a solid understanding of the constraints
that influence Yemen’s leadership, especially the nuances of Yemen’s relations with its most influential
neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and the views of the Yemeni
public on both al-Qaeda and U.S. objectives in the region.
The tasks associated with developing and implementing effective policy for Yemen are challenging.
Yemen is remote from the United States and has traditionally generated little interest in Washington. Until
recently, it has seldom been linked to important U.S.
national interests. Moreover, Yemeni values and attitudes have been formed within a very different type
of society than those of the West. The potential for distrust, misunderstanding, and miscommunication is
therefore strong, although the importance of the U.SYemeni relationship has seldom been greater, due to
a variety of factors including the rise of al-Qaeda in
that country. Fortunately, while Yemeni society and
politics are complex, they are also comprehensible.
Moreover, well-informed U.S. planning efforts to help
Yemen and ensure stability in the Arabian Peninsula
are clearly possible.
This work hopes to provide an overview of many
of the most important issues that must be considered
when addressing Yemen policy, as well as suggesting
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possible approaches to obtaining important U.S. and
Yemeni goals in the region. It is hoped that the reader
will find this work useful in understanding and untangling many of the complexities of the Yemeni political, economic, and international situations that touch
upon key U.S. and Western interests.
THE YEMENI POLITICAL SYSTEM IN CRISIS
Yemen is a large and strategically important country in the southern Arabian Peninsula bordering Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden
within the Arabian Sea. It is also the poorest country
in the Arab World, with a population that has been
unrelentingly resistant to significant central government involvement in local affairs (except to provide
resources). The territory outside of the capital of
Sana’a is difficult for a national authority to control
due to restive, well-armed, and powerful tribes spread
across a diverse geography, including vast desert areas and extremely rugged mountains. These tribes
have at various points in their history resisted the authority of the Ottoman Turks, British military forces in
the south, and various Yemeni governments that they
judged as being too heavy-handed in their relations
with tribal leaders. Historically, Yemeni tribes have
also been willing to show conditional loyalty to national government authorities that avoid taxing them
and that provide them with gifts of money, weapons,
and other forms of support. A frequent and sly comment on the political culture is that loyalty is rented in
Yemen rather than bought.
Yemen is currently the only nonmonarchy on the
Arabian Peninsula, as well as one of that region’s
most heavily populated countries.4 Its population of
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23,500,000 is almost comparable with that of Saudi
Arabia, and the birth rates of both countries suggest
that Yemen is rapidly becoming the most populous
country in the Gulf. The Yemeni population is currently growing by around 3.45 percent per year, and
is expected to reach 38 million in the next 15 years.5
Yemen’s poverty, political geography, republican
form of government, and large and rapidly expanding
population distinguish it from the other states of the
Arabian Peninsula, including the wealthy, sparselypopulated monarchies. Yemeni society is composed
of two major Islamic sects which are variants on the
traditional Sunni and Shi’ite forms of Islam found
elsewhere. Yemen’s current president, Ali Abdullah
Saleh, is a member of Yemen’s Shi’ite Muslim sect,
known as Zaydis. The monarchy that his republican
predecessors overthrew in 1962 was also governed by
a Zaydi imam and his circle. Around a third of Yemen’s population is composed of Zaydis, the dominant
group in the northern part of the country. Yemen’s
form of Sunni Islam is known as Shafeism. Shafeism
and Zaydism share many similarities in doctrine and
rituals, and the gap between the sects has narrowed
in the last few decades due to state efforts to stress
cooperation between sects. Zaydi beliefs and rituals
are usually considered to have much less in common
with the Twelver Shi’ism practiced in Iran and Iraq
than with Yemeni Shafeism.
Yemen’s years as a republic began with a September 1962 military coup d’état in what was then the
separate country of North Yemen (the Yemen Arab
Republic [YAR]).6 This coup’s leadership overthrew a
traditional imamate that had ruled the area either independently or under formal Ottoman sovereignty for
over 1,000 years.7 The new leadership consisted of left-
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ist military officers who were heavily influenced by the
Arab nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric of Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. 8 Correspondingly, the 1962 change in government (often called a
revolution) was strongly supported by the Egyptian
government, which viewed the imam’s ouster in ideological terms, whereby a pro-Egyptian modernizing
military elite would replace a reactionary monarchical leader.9 The imam’s ouster also led to a long and
bloody civil war between the new government (supported by a large Egyptian expeditionary force) and
tribal rebels seeking the restoration of the imamate.10
At the height of their involvement in Yemen, Egyptian
forces included at least 60,000 troops which made use
of chemical warfare to combat tribal-based opposition
to the new government.11 Conversely, royalist fighters
received substantial military and financial aid from
Saudi Arabia and made exceptionally good use of the
difficult terrain of the northern Yemeni mountains.
This conflict lasted almost 8 years and concluded only
in 1970, although Egyptian forces had withdrawn several years earlier, following Cairo’s massive June 1967
defeat by Israel.12 The North Yemen Civil War was
widely described as “Nasser’s Vietnam.”13
Somewhat surprisingly, North Yemen’s republican government survived in office following the
withdrawal of Egyptian troops from that country. The
government’s ability to retain formal authority and
at least some power was partially made possible by
divisions and infighting among the tribes that had opposed it. North Yemen’s republic also survived due
to strong governmental efforts to establish acceptable
relations with enough of these tribes to avoid a final
confrontation against them. The Yemeni government
further moved decisively to improve its relations with
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Riyadh and thereby halt outside funding for the rebellion. Republican compromise with the tribes and
Saudi Arabia thus prevented the development of a
powerful Yemeni government and assured that the
Sana’a leadership curbed their ideas about extending
their authority and modernizing the country.14 Elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, South Yemen became
independent in 1967 after 128 years as an amalgam
of protectorates of the United Kingdom.15 This newly
independent country then established itself as the
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the
Arab World’s first Marxist government, and quickly
moved to establish close relations with the Soviet bloc.
Later, South Yemen gave up its separate existence and
merged with the more populous North Yemen in 1990.
This was done primarily from a well-founded fear of
economic bankruptcy and political isolation following
the loss of aid due to the then impending collapse of
the Soviet Union. Political and ideological differences
between northern and southern Yemenis were expected to be addressed and resolved through a system
of political democracy including multiparty elections.
With this future environment in mind, a number of
southern Yemeni leaders entered the union in the expectation that they would play an important role in
the new government and that the Yemeni electorate
would quickly come to view them as the true modernizers. Such expectations were dashed when they
were increasingly overshadowed and then marginalized by former North Yemeni President Ali Abdullah
Saleh, who had retained his position as president and
the head of state in the newly united Yemen. Saleh’s
political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC),
dramatically outperformed the Yemeni Socialist Party
(YSP) in the April 1993 Parliamentary elections, help-
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ing him to consolidate power and marginalize southern rivals.16 For reasons to be examined later, this was
to be the last election where the YSP was an important
competitor.17
Despite the views of many southern Yemenis
about the self-evident superiority of socialism, President Saleh’s political skills at marginalizing his southern competitors should not have come as a surprise
to anyone. Saleh had taken power in North Yemen
in July 1978, more than a decade prior to the merger,
replacing caretaker president Abdul Karim al-Arashi,
who served for only 3 weeks before turning his position over to Saleh. Although Arashi served for an
exceptionally brief period, he at least walked away
with his life. The two Yemeni presidents serving in
the years immediately prior to Arashi’s pathetic term
were both assassinated as a result of the turbulent
Arabian Peninsula politics of that era. Arashi’s immediate predecessor, President Ahmad al-Ghashmi (in
office 1977-78) was murdered by an envoy from South
Yemen in what appears to have been part of a power
struggle in the PDRY. The preceding president, Ibrahim al-Hamdi (in office 1974-77), was assassinated by
an individual who is widely believed to have been a
Saudi agent. The Riyadh leaders at that time feared
that the North Yemeni president was seeking a rapprochement with the PDRY that could have become a
serious national security threat to them.18 Saleh himself became president at age 35 and was not widely expected to survive for long in the top job. Nevertheless,
he defied these low expectations and has remained in
power ever since that time through brilliant political
skills and personal toughness. Later, as previously
noted, Saleh became president of a united Yemen in
1990 when North and South Yemen merged. He has
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remained in that position ever since, outmaneuvering
all domestic opponents and using the military to crush
a 1994 attempt by southern leaders to secede from a
united Yemen in a 10-week civil war.
Saleh’s longevity in power and craftiness as president has nevertheless not made governing Yemen easier over time, or allowed him to consolidate power as
the leader of a powerful and well-organized autocratic
regime. It is consequently impossible to consider him
to be a strong president such as Egyptian leader Hosni
Mubarak, let alone a despot like former Iraqi dictator,
Saddam Hussein. Rather, President Saleh compares
his efforts to balance the often competing concerns
of Yemen’s tribes, religious groups, political factions,
and interested outside powers to “dancing on the
heads of snakes,” a continuous struggle to make exactly the right moves to avoid serious confrontations
with powerful political groups, families, and tribes.19
Others sometimes suggest his tactics are more like
a divide and rule strategy, expertly exploiting and
sometimes widening the fissures in Yemeni society.
In this struggle, the president’s chief tool of governance is a network of patronage relationships and
subsidies provided to friendly individuals, families,
and tribes in exchange for support.20 The government
sometimes uses police and military repression to enforce its policies, but this approach is usually a last
resort which cannot always be applied efficiently and
effectively within strongly tribalized regions. Yemen
consequently runs on a system of tribal subsidies and
bribes, with tribal leaders consistently showing an interest in money that supersedes concerns about religion, ideology, or politics.21 In essence, tribal leaders
base their support for the government on how much it
is willing to provide to them.
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Additionally, throughout Saleh’s time in office, Yemen has often been described as a “family regime,”
in which the president’s relatives and members of his
Sahhan tribe have steadily been placed in a number
of key national security positions in order to protect
the regime. This approach is a partial hedge against
the system of rented loyalty and shifting alliances that
characterize Yemeni political culture. Unsurprisingly,
in this environment, the president’s oldest son, Colonel Ahmed Ali Saleh, is expected to become a serious
contender for the office of president upon his father’s
death or retirement. Currently, Colonel Saleh is the
commander of Yemen’s Republican Guard and the
Yemeni Army’s elite Special Forces units. In addition
to placing his son in this key position, President Saleh
appointed his half-brother as the commander of the
Yemeni Air Force, while the president’s nephews command the Central Security Organization (CSO) and
the Presidential Guards.22 Another leading regime figure is Brigadier General Ali Mushin al-Ahmar, who is
sometimes identified as the second most powerful individual within the government. He is often described
as a “kinsman” of President Saleh, although the exact
nature of their family ties is unclear.23 Mushin has
played a significant role in many key regime policies,
including the recruitment of Yemenis to fight in the
anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.24 He has also played
a major role in leading the military struggle against
Houthi rebels in the northern part of the country.25
Within the labyrinth of regime and family politics,
succession is an increasingly important issue. President Saleh is currently in his late 60s (born on March
21, 1942), and was most recently reelected to his post
in a September 2006 election for an additional 7-year
term in office. 26 It is not known if he will seek another

9

term in office in 2013 at the age of 71. To do so may
require an amendment to the Yemeni Constitution or
perhaps a friendly legal interpretation of the eligibility requirements regarding a sitting president’s ability to seek a third term in office.27 Some solution of
this sort should be obtainable if Saleh decides to seek
reelection. Nevertheless, at some point, the current
president will not be able to continue to serve in office.
At that juncture, whoever ultimately follows Saleh
will face Yemen’s exceptionally serious economic
and security problems, with fewer carefully nurtured
domestic alliances and less political experience than
Saleh currently possesses. The new leadership will
also have to consolidate power within the system of
political, tribal, and personal relationships that Saleh
has constructed throughout his years in power. The
president’s son, Ahmed Saleh, is something of an unknown as a political leader, and his skills at managing
and manipulating Yemeni power centers are untested.
Perhaps shrewdly, the younger Saleh has maintained
a low public profile in Yemeni politics despite the
possibility that he may have a solid claim to be the
presidential heir apparent. Ahmed probably made
this choice in the knowledge that bloodless coups
by sons against their aging fathers are not unknown
in the contemporary Arab World.28 While there is
no evidence that President Saleh is concerned about
Ahmed’s activities, it may be useful for any careful
son to seek no more than reflected glory under such
sensitive conditions.
In addition to being a highly tribalized nation, Yemen has the most well-armed society in the Middle
East. Virtually all Yemeni men have rifles, and one’s
standing within rural Yemeni tribal communities is
often enhanced by the possession of high quality fire-

10

arms and other personal weapons such as hand grenades. Yemeni tribes have often been able to obtain
crew-served weapons, including machine guns and
mortars. Reacting to this excess, Yemen’s government
has attempted to institute some curbs on weapons
possession and publicly carrying small arms over
the past few years. These efforts have been of limited scope and effectiveness. Openly carrying assault
rifles and similar weapons in cities was prohibited
in 2007, and some firearms markets (apparently operating without government permission) were also
closed in that year.29 These measures had no practical
impact on the availability of weapons throughout the
country. Moreover, the most heavily armed segment
of Yemen’s population lives in rural areas, and these
people often view possession of small arms as essential for their security. Correspondingly, any extensive
efforts to regulate weapons more aggressively could
meet a serious backlash and would remain unenforceable in the areas of the country that the government
does not control.
Even more alarming than the issue of unregulated
small arms is the state of the Yemeni economy. Yemen’s economic system is currently under severe
strain and may be in danger of collapsing if ongoing
trends are not reversed. In addition to worldwide
problems created by the global economic recession,
Yemen is faced with diminishing oil resources, an exploding population, an escalating strain on water resources, and other serious economic problems. Sana’a,
in particular, is widely expected to be hit by especially
severe water shortages in the next decade.30 Unemployment is also at a shocking 35 percent, according to
a 2010 interview with Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Megwar.31 Sadly, under these circumstances,
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the Yemeni middle class has been steadily shrinking
over the last decade, and this destabilizing trend is expected to continue without significant new sources of
income. Hunger and malnutrition are already serious
problems, with the potential to become significantly
worse. According to the United Nations (UN) World
Food Program, around 7.2 million Yemenis suffer
from chronic hunger, and the possibility of famine exists.32
Additionally, Yemen would clearly face an even
more severe employment crisis without its bloated
public sector employment, although many of these
jobs are unproductive and contribute little or nothing
to economic development.33 Adding to these problems,
Yemen already has an extremely young population,
with almost 44 percent of its population under age 14,
and current population growth trends will dramatically increase the Yemeni youth bulge with no clear
corresponding ability to provide jobs for these young
people.34 Large groups of unemployed youth may also
become a major force for instability.
Yemen reached peak oil production in 2004, and its
output has been decreasing since that time. Currently,
the Yemeni economy produces less than 300,000 barrels of oil per day of which around half is exported.35
The revenues obtained through these exports usually contribute around three-quarters of the funding
for the national budget.36 Unfortunately, Yemen has
responded to falling oil revenues by increasing the
exploitation of its two major oil fields of Masilah and
Safar in an attempt to compensate for their declining
output and maintain a steady source of government
funds.37 This approach has some short-term financial
advantages, but more ominously suggests the possibility of an almost total production crash around
2017.38
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Other sources of hard currency are equally problematic. The Yemenis have only recently begun efforts
to export liquefied natural gas, and it remains uncertain how successful this effort will be.39 The oncepromising tourism sector has been partially undermined by occasional incidents where terrorists have
killed or kidnapped tourists for a variety of reasons,
including disapproval of the policies of the tourists’
home country.40 The past tribal practice of kidnapping foreigners and treating them well while using
them as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from
the government still occurs, but there are now more
brutal kidnappings that sometime result in the prisoners’ deaths, as well as the direct tourist assassinations
where there is no intent to kidnap, only to kill.41
The expanding Yemeni population and possible
collapse in export income have implications for resource distribution, including that of water and food,
but such systemic issues are not the only dimensions
of these problems. Looming water shortages are also
a result of misplaced agricultural priorities, including
the excessive cultivation of the shrub, qat (catha edulis),
which requires large amounts of water and good agricultural land but has no nutritional value. Qat has been
cultivated in Yemen for at least 600 years as a chewed
stimulant, which produces a feeling of euphoria after
several hours followed by a state of mental depression.42 It is often described by both Yemenis and nonYemenis as a mild narcotic, although this classification
seems to be one of convenience rather than medical
fact. According to the Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister
for Economic Affairs, “Though it is not a drug as many
believe, it has many harmful effects, especially when
it takes up a major proportion of the family’s spending at the expense of food and schooling.”43 While the
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tragedy of wasting water and land resources on qat is
apparent to many government planners, no Yemeni
government has ever been able to impose serious constraints on its cultivation and use, which is deeply entrenched in Yemeni society. Around three-quarters of
all Yemeni men use qat regularly and usually spend a
significant percentage of their income to do so. While
it has not always been socially acceptable for women
to chew qat, this outlook is changing and the number
of women users is now expanding.44 Unsurprisingly,
qat is one of the most lucrative cash crops for Yemeni
farmers.
An additional Yemeni problem with both political
and economic dimensions is corruption, which is so
pervasive that some analysts have labeled the Yemeni
political system a “kleptocracy,” in which most officials
use their positions to enrich themselves, their families,
and key associates.45 The system of corruption begins
with hundreds of thousands of lower-ranking and
badly paid government employees and soldiers who
seek small bribes in the performance of their duties, to
the much more important tribal leaders, government
officials, businessmen, and military officers who are
able to conduct corrupt activities on a much larger
scale.46 The low pay of ordinary soldiers and junior
government officials tends to bias the system toward
corrupt practices, which many people find necessary
simply to survive. More senior officials naturally have
greater opportunities for corruption, which they often exploit to the maximum extent possible. These
circumstances are reflected on most recent Corruption Perceptions Index of the international watchdog
organization Transparency International, which gives
Yemen an abysmal ranking of 154 out of 180 countries
(with 1 being the best rating for controlling corruption).47 Moreover, Yemeni ratings have been getting
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progressively worse over the last few years, and are a
potential indicator of cripplingly dysfunctional levels
of corruption throughout the political and economic
systems. It should be noted, however, that some, and
perhaps many, Yemeni public officials chose to limit
their corrupt activities and others may not be corrupt
at all.48 Even this degree of restraint may disappear if
the Yemeni economy continues to decline as is widely
expected.
As Yemen’s middle class continues to shrink and
nationwide poverty deepens, it is unclear how tolerant Yemeni society will remain of continuing corrupt
practices, the most significant of which benefit only
a limited number of political elites. The public may
have already become cynical about reform due to the
half-hearted, duplicitous, and ineffective measures
to control corruption in the past. In the late 1990s, for
example, the government announced efforts to move
forward on issues such as reducing bribery, improving
the efficiency of government bureaucrats, and eliminating unnecessary jobs. Unfortunately, the campaign
soon emerged as a disguised purge that allowed the
president to oust senior officials whose loyalty to him
may have been in doubt, while increasing the security
of his senior aides and closest associates.49
YEMEN’S SECURITY CONCERNS WITH THE
HOUTHI REBELLION AND THE SOUTHERN
SECESSIONISTS
Yemeni leaders, including the president, publicly
maintain that fighting al-Qaeda forces in Yemen is
their country’s “first priority” for national security.50
Such assurances are almost certainly misstatements
designed to placate the United States, Saudi Arabia,
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and other interested countries and particularly to reassure those countries that provide aid to Yemen.51
Behind such declarations, the Sana’a government, and
especially the population, have conventionally seen
the actions of al-Qaeda as primarily a set of Western
and Saudi problems.52 This perception has now faded
significantly among many senior government officials
in recent years due to an escalation of the fighting
between al-Qaeda and the security forces. Unfortunately, much of the population remains unconvinced
that al-Qaeda is a serious threat since the organization does not usually target nongovernmental Yemeni
civilians. Of course, civilians have suffered collateral
deaths in al-Qaeda operations against security targets,
and civilian deaths are sometimes collateral to infrastructure attacks.53 Many Yemeni civilians also believe
that the growth of al-Qaeda’s strength throughout the
region is a natural response to legitimate Arab anger
over U.S. policies in the Middle East, particularly regarding Israel, the Palestinians, and Iraq. In a further
complication, Yemeni news media commentators
have frequently expressed their belief that the United
States is insufficiently concerned about civilian collateral damage in its struggle against al-Qaeda throughout the Islamic World.54
The Yemeni government also faces other security
concerns which its leaders may view as more threatening than al-Qaeda. These two concerns are an intermittent rebellion by northern Zaydi tribesmen, known
as Houthis, and the separate and growing secessionist movement in the southern part of the country in
what was formerly the PDRY. The Houthi rebellion is
currently experiencing a shaky cease-fire, which the
government publicly refers to as a permanent end to
the conflict. This interpretation seems doubtful for
reasons which will be discussed below. Either of these
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conflicts has the potential to sap the already steeply
diminished energies of the Yemeni government and
security forces, thereby rendering them less effective
in fighting terrorism and supporting policies of internal economic development. The continuation of both
conflicts would be especially difficult for Sana’a.
The Houthi Rebellion.
The Houthi rebellion has its origins with nonviolent anti-government demonstrations that broke out
in Sa’ada province in northern Yemen in January 2003
under the leadership of Hussein al-Houthi, a prominent northern political leader, who was also one of
the first members of the Yemeni parliament. At that
time, the Houthi establishment and its supporters had
become increasingly alienated from the Yemeni government over what they characterized as economic
discrimination against their home province of Sa’ada
in the north, as well as the government’s excessive
tolerance of Saudi-inspired anti-Shi’ite agitation in
northern Yemen. These activities included the whitehot rhetoric of Saudi-trained anti-Shi’ite clerics who
were sponsored and heavily funded by the Riyadh
government.55 Many assertive Salafi clerics maintain
that the Zaydis and all other Shi’ites are heretics and
apostates from true Islam.
In the aftermath of the January 2003 demonstrations, President Saleh unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate some sort of reconciliation with Hussein alHouthi. Meanwhile anti-government demonstrations
continued and even spread to the Grand Mosque in
Sana’a. The conflict also intensified in the north with
increasingly angry demonstrations there. While the
Houthis had serious grievances related to their re-
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gion, they challenged Saleh on a more direct and fundamental level by accusing the Yemeni government
of placing itself in the service of the United States
and Israel at the expense of Arab and Yemeni interests. Saleh viewed such charges as close to treasonous
and was especially concerned because they came at a
time of widespread Yemeni anger over the U.S.-led
2003 invasion of Iraq and the continuing unpopularity
of Yemeni cooperation with the United States in the
“war on terror.” The rebels also continued to maintain
that their region had been victimized by ongoing governmental discrimination and received limited public
resources when compared to other parts of Yemen.
Under these circumstances, Saleh lost his patience
with negotiations and unsuccessfully moved to have
Houthi arrested. This failed move led to the outbreak
of war.
The first round of sustained fighting in Sa’ada took
place from June 18 until September 10, 2004. After the
move against Houthi, he and his political organization, the “Believing Youth” (Shabab al-Moumineen)
moved to expel government troops and bureaucrats
from Sa’ada. The government responded to Houthi
acts of rebellion by increasing its military presence
in the northern area, with fighting continuing in the
north until Hussein al-Houthi’s death in September
2004. The conflict has repeatedly reignited and continued sporadically since that time, with the rebels
led by al-Houthi’s brothers, including Abdul Malik
al-Houthi. Qatar helped to negotiate a cease-fire in
2007 and a more comprehensive peace deal in 2008,
but these agreements eventually broke down, and a
new government military campaign was initiated in
Sa’ada province on August 11, 2009, under the menacing name, Operation Scorched Earth.
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The conflict with the Houthis then assumed a new
dimension, with direct Saudi Arabian military intervention in the northern Yemeni fighting in November
2009 when some of the rebels crossed into Saudi territory, killing at least two border guards and apparently
taking control of two or more Saudi border villages.56
These audacious actions provoked a strong Saudi response based on the Riyadh leadership’s anger over
the aggressive violation of its sovereignty and the special concerns they harbor about hostile forces based in
Yemen.
Yemen has a 700-mile border with Saudi Arabia,
porous in many places, that can be used by criminals, smugglers, terrorists, and insurgents. The easy
availability of arms in Yemen is a further complication, with most of the illegal weapons and explosives
smuggled into Saudi Arabia coming from Yemen. The
Saudis watched the Sa’ada conflict anxiously, becoming especially concerned when Houthi forces crossed
into Saudi territory. Houthi spokesmen stated that
they had crossed into Saudi Arabia because Riyadh
had allowed the Yemeni military to use Saudi territory
to wage war against them.57 In response, Riyadh took
decisive action, with Saudi military strikes against
Houthi rebels rapidly unfolding as the largest combat operation that they had undertaken since the 1991
Gulf War. Saudi tactics in this conflict involved the
heavy use of artillery and airpower bombardment followed by the deployment of infantry in mopping up
operations.58 The strategy behind this form of warfare
was to employ firepower to destroy large elements of
the Houthi forces so that Saudi infantry could more
easily defeat the residual military forces.
Such tactics were only partially successful. The
Saudi army reported that at least 133 of its soldiers
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were killed in action, with an undisclosed number of
others wounded or captured in the fighting.59 The Saudis discontinued their military involvement in the war
in February 2010 when the Houthis withdrew from
Saudi territory, a cease-fire involving both the Yemeni
and Saudi governments was established, and all Saudi
prisoners were returned.60
The Houthis agreed to the six point truce with the
Sana’a leadership in February 2010, although it is unclear how long such a truce can be maintained. The
Yemeni government did not address major Houthi
grievances over discrimination and lack of development aid, and it is uncertain whether it will seek to do
so at a later time. Despite these unresolved problems,
President Saleh has attempted to project optimism
on this issue, maintaining that “we can say the war is
over; not stopped or in a truce.” 61 Nevertheless, few
informed observers view this result as likely without
an intensive and ongoing governmental campaign to
consolidate peaceful relations. Such concerns seem to
have been underscored in July 2010 when 4 days of
serious fighting again broke out between Houthis and
either regular army troops or auxiliary government
tribesmen who had been fighting beside the Yemeni
army.62 At least 40 people were killed in this fighting,
according to sources on both sides.63 The conflict was
then finally brought under control by tribal mediators.
Despite the problems noted above, there have also
been serious efforts to maintain the truce. The Qatari
government, in particular, chose to recommit itself to
the struggle for peace in northern Yemen, falling back
upon its familiar role as mediator. In late August 2010,
the Qataris sponsored a meeting in Doha in which the
two sides agreed to an “explanatory appendix” associated with the earlier agreement.64 The signing of this
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document by representatives of both the Yemeni government and the Houthi leadership was dutifully witnessed by Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The main goal of the Houthis in these negotiations
was to obtain the release of around 1,000 prisoners
who had been taken in the fighting in the north. The
government agreed to meet this Houthi demand, and
in return the Houthis agreed to surrender captured
government weapons to Qatari mediators.65
The Yemeni government disputes Houthi claims
that their recurring rebellions have been a response to
continuous discrimination against the northern region
and that they never sought to overthrow the Yemeni
republic. Rather, Sana’a charges that the Houthis initiated the conflict in order to return Yemen to the days
when it was ruled by a Zaydi imam, and that they
would select such an imam from the senior leadership
of the Houthi family. Additionally, while President
Saleh is a Zaydi and therefore a member of the same
Islamic sect as the Houthis, his lineage is not distinguished, and someone with his family background
would not be eligible to become a Yemeni imam even
if a non-Houthi was chosen.66
Saleh would never wish to achieve such status,
however, since he is particularly contemptuous of the
traditional stratified structure of Zaydi society associated with the imamate. Conversely, throughout the
conflict, rebellious Houthis have often maintained that
President Saleh has betrayed his co-religionists and it
is therefore their right to defend themselves against
the excesses of his regime. The right to rebel against
an unjust leader is deeply ingrained in Zaydi doctrine,
history, and tradition.67 Moreover, the Houthis gained
some moral high ground in the conflict since their
attacks have been directed at Yemeni military and
governmental targets, although this approach is not
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surprising as the fighting occurred on Houthi home
terrain.
Houthi leaders have made considerable use of antiU.S. and anti-Israeli rhetoric during previous rounds
of fighting and have particularly enjoyed excoriating
President Saleh for his ties with Washington, which
they refer to as an alliance. While these criticisms may
embarrass the Saleh regime with the Yemeni public,
they also make it significantly easier for his government to characterize the Houthis as radicals and terrorists before an international audience. Such charges
come in an interesting context. There is no evidence
linking the Houthis to al-Qaeda, and they are known
to be bitterly hostile to that organization and all Salafi
jihadists. The Yemeni government has therefore not
wasted its effort or credibility by attempting to link
the Houthis with al-Qaeda terrorists.
They have, however, frequently accused Iran of
backing the Houthi rebels with funding, training, and
material aid. Yemen further claims that such support
is provided either directly by Iran or through Arabic speaking surrogates such as the radical Lebanese
group Hezbollah. 68 The Iranian leadership reinforces
this perception with rhetorical support for the Houthis
in a policy of religious solidarity. It is difficult to imagine that they could remain silent on an issue so important to the Shi’ite community.69 Yemen’s charges
involving Iranian materiel support and training have
not been proven and may be at least partially based
on the fact that the rebels are Shi’ite, although they are
Fiver Shi’ites rather than the Twelver Shi’ites found
in Iran. Yemeni government officials have sometime
charged that the Houthi leadership seeks to move
its followers away from the principles and practices
of moderate Shi’ite Islam to a more militant form of
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Twelver Shi’ism modeled after the Iranian approach
to religion.70 The Yemeni government has also accused
Libya of supporting the Houthi rebels, but provided
no credible evidence to support these accusations.71
The nature of the Sa’ada conflict may have created
difficulties for the prospect of permanent Houthi reconciliation with the government. The Yemeni army
does not have a well-developed doctrine for counterinsurgency, and Houthi civilian casualties have often
been reported to be heavy. The Houthis claim to have
suffered over 25,000 deaths at the hands of the Yemeni
military since 2003, although other estimates are significantly lower.72 Critics of the Saleh government have
gone so far as to state that civilians are deliberately
targeted by government forces and pro-government
auxiliary units.73 Such charges are plausible. The problem of waging conventional war in mountainous terrain had previously led the Saleh government to hire
thousands of mercenary tribesmen from elsewhere
in Yemen to help the army conduct military operations in the north. It is doubtful that these irregulars
fight with a great deal of regard for the laws of armed
conflict or make a careful effort to distinguish guerrilla fighters from their noncombatant sympathizers.
Under these circumstances, the conflict has displaced
around 250,000 people, with around 100,000 of these
refugees having fled since late 2009 due to an especially intense outbreak of fighting at that time.
The Yemeni government came under considerable
international, and especially American, pressure to
reach a negotiated solution to the Houthi war in the
aftermath of the December 2009 terrorist bombing attempt against a Detroit, Michigan-bound U.S. civilian
aircraft by an individual trained by anti-government
extremists in Yemen (which will be discussed later).
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Many U.S. and allied leaders would prefer to see the
Yemeni government concentrate its efforts on defeating al-Qaeda rather than fighting the Houthis, and
the failed attack on a U.S. aircraft served to intensify
these priorities. The Yemenis have responded to this
pressure by stressing that they are already making
strong progress against al-Qaeda and have achieved
peace with the Houthis. The shaky nature of the current truce nevertheless suggests that cooperative relations will have to be strengthened and consolidated as
quickly as possible in order to avoid collapse.
The Southern Movement.
The Yemeni government is also deeply concerned
about a serious secessionist movement in the southern
part of the country, which reemerged as a significant
political force in 2007. Although almost all of the important leaders of the Southern Movement emphatically stress nonviolent political confrontation, the
government views them as a grave and potentially
expanding threat against Yemeni national unity, fearing they may ultimately shift to routine use of violent
tactics. Moreover, the disagreement between the two
sides to this conflict could hardly be more fundamental. The unification of the two Yemens is an especially
sensitive issue to the Sana’a leadership and is sufficiently weighty to be viewed as the president’s most
significant achievement in over 30 years of rule. On
a more pragmatic level, the Saleh government would
be loathe to surrender vital oil producing areas of the
Hadhramout area of the south before the resources
there have been fully extracted. Perhaps most significantly, a breakaway southern regime could establish
itself as an enemy of the current government once
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it achieved independence. In this regard, the PDRY
was often at odds with its northern neighbor during its separate existence, and there were two border
wars between the Yemens when they were separate
countries, one in 1972 and the other in 1979.75 An additional concern is that the south itself has serious fissures and that a break with northern Yemen may not
result in a unified southern state. Different portions of
the southern region may seek independence or quasiindependence, following any break with Sana’a. This
possibility is particularly serious with the important
Hadhramout province, whose people sometime view
themselves as quite distinct from other Yemenis.76
The current confrontation between the northerndominated government and southern secessionists
appears to date back to differing expectations about
how a unified Yemen would be governed following
the 1990 merger. The unification of the two countries
was undertaken without a great deal of preparation
or transitional moves, despite the vastly different
types of governments and political cultures within
the two Yemens. The leaders of South Yemen agreed
to unify at a time when their country’s circumstances
were particularly troubling, and they believed that
they possessed few acceptable options. The PDRY had
been an expensive client of the Soviet Union, which
by 1990 was in unmistakable decline and unwilling
to further subsidize Marxist regimes in the developing world. Likewise, during its long involvement with
leftist radicalism, the PDRY had managed to get itself
placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of countries
supporting terrorism.77 Consequently, the prospect of
a rapprochement with the United States or the conservative Arab states seemed nonexistent without some
dramatic change in the way southern Yemen was per-
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ceived internationally. Unfortunately for beleaguered
southern leaders, the new and significant oil deposits were discovered only after the two Yemens had
agreed to unify. These discoveries would probably
have caused southerners to entertain second thoughts
about the value of the entire enterprise if they had
been identified earlier.
Perhaps because of their dire circumstances, the
southern leadership was also inclined to believe the
Saleh regime’s assurances that they would have an
important role in determining the future of a united
Yemen and that the political system would reflect a
modern political outlook. Most doctrinaire Yemeni socialists felt that faster movement towards secularism
and a planned economy was more or less inevitable if
Yemen was to advance in the political and economic
realms, which they assumed was an underlying goal
of both northern and southern Yemenis. They also assumed that their political leadership was especially
well-prepared to lead the way to such changes. The
northern Yemenis, by contrast, tended to view their
role as something akin to that of West Germany absorbing East Germany, a neighboring state that no longer possessed much justification for an independent
existence after its system of government had failed.78
The northern leadership further believed that they
should have a larger role in deciding their nation’s future since the population of the YAR was significantly
larger than that of the PDRY. Saleh successfully used
the latter argument as the decisive reason for him to
retain the presidency after the two countries unified,
while the PDRY leader became vice president.
Yemen’s unification was accompanied by both
sides’ acceptance of a variety of democratic institutions and the development of a multiparty political
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system that was expected to create opportunities for
all Yemenis to work through their political and economic differences. Throughout the process, President
Saleh nevertheless maintained a disproportionate level of control over the country’s finances, while significant steps to unify the separate militaries were never
taken due to the distrust of both sides. The Yemeni
president used his political power and skills to ensure
that he and the GPC were able to marginalize the influence of many of the most important southern leaders, while cultivating pliable figurehead allies from
the south. This approach helped bolster the appearance of power-sharing, while actually undermining it.
This task became much easier after the GPC won the
parliamentary elections in a landslide in April 1993,
with the former governing party of South Yemen
(Yemeni Socialist Party—YSA) emerging as a distant
third behind the GPC and the Islamic party, Islah.79
As their political setbacks multiplied, many southern
leaders came to regret their decision to support the
merger. This situation reached a crisis in 1994 as the
former leaders of the PDRY attempted to dissolve the
union and reestablish a separate southern state after
they came to the conclusion that southern interests
and their own vision for a united Yemen were being largely ignored. A 10-week civil war followed, in
which around 7,000 Yemenis died and the southern
secessionists were decisively defeated.80 Most of their
leadership that was able to do so fled into exile to escape charges of treason and probable execution.
Secessionism reemerged as a visible and expanding political force during summer 2007, being touched
off by the anger of forcibly retired officers from the
PDRY’s army and air force. These officers and their
supporters became involved in political demonstra-
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tions against the extremely low level of support former
members of the southern military received in military
pensions after quietly seeking redress for a number of
years. Predictably, as the forced retirees of a defeated
military, they had virtually no influence with which
to press the government to move forward on their
grievances. Moreover, the government’s dismissive
treatment of the ex-officers was widely viewed in the
south as yet another symbol of a vindictive northern
occupation in the aftermath of the 1994 civil war. The
impasse also served as a spark unleashing southern
anger after a range of other perceived affronts. Most
southerners continued to believe that their region suffered widespread neglect while southern leaders were
accorded only a cosmetic and stage-managed role in
policymaking.
Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that
the secessionist movement continued to grow after
being ignited by the retired officers’ demonstrations.81
In December 2007, the full scope of the movement became clear as the result of a massive funeral procession for four southern men killed by security forces
under suspicious circumstances. Estimates suggest
that hundreds of thousands of mourners attended,
thereby demonstrating their solidarity with the southern cause.82 Enthusiasm for the cause of independence
also surged in the aftermath of this event. By 2009,
large numbers of protesters were attending recurring
rallies, where a number of participants waved the
flag of the former Marxist republic.83 Moreover, there
are now at least seven activist organizations seeking
southern independence.84 The Southern Movement
has also held rallies at particularly sensitive times,
such as directly after Yemeni presidential appeals for
increased aid from abroad.85 The reasoning here is that
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these rallies may complicate aid requests and perhaps
more importantly cause the government to moderate repressive actions while it is appealing for foreign
support, at least to the extent of limiting the use of
deadly force against demonstrators. The government
has responded to increased agitation by raising the
visibility of military and security forces on the streets
during times of tension and by maintaining rigorous
efforts to prevent demonstrations that have been organized without permits.86
Activists struggling for southern independence
also face the possibility of arrest on such charges as
inciting violence and undermining national unity.
Sentences for such actions can be quite hefty, as indicated in a March 2010 decision by a special security
court to sentence a leading activist of the southern
independence struggle to 5 years in prison on these
charges.87 One month later, four activists convicted on
similar charges were given 10-year sentences.88 Many
of the prisoners who have received these sentences
have so far been defiant. Two of them have stated that
they consider the verdict to be a medal which they
would wear proudly.89 At least one of the prisoners
has refused to appeal his verdict. There have also been
harsh government measures employed to prevent or
break up demonstrations, including the use of tear gas
and firing live ammunition at or near protestors. The
rules of engagement for these encounters are not clear
to outsiders, but there have been a number of demonstrations where protestors have been wounded,
and a few have been killed in various incidents. As
with certain other countries (such as royalist Iran in
1978-79), protestor deaths do not always quell unrest,
and in Yemen they sometimes spark new and larger
demonstrations in response to the deaths of peaceful
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activists.90 The government consistently defends the
actions of the security forces and opposes efforts to
initiate independent investigations regarding the use
of force.91
Brutality against demonstrators is inherently dangerous since Yemeni civilians have easy access to firearms, and any use of deadly force against demonstrators can potentially turn into a bloodbath.92 The vast
majority of the Southern Movement has nevertheless
remained strongly committed to nonviolence despite
the serious and recurring problems at demonstrations.
This restraint is especially impressive given the wide
variety of loosely coordinated organizations under
the umbrella of the Southern Movement, but there are
also smaller groups seeking southern independence
through the use of violence, and there have been a few
instances of rioting as well.93 On some occasions, individual Yemeni soldiers away from their comrades
have been killed in the south, and the Yemeni news
media sometimes describe these events as assassinations by secessionists. More recently, government car
convoys have been ambushed including two separate
motorcades, each carrying a different deputy prime
minister. These incidents also led to suspicions toward
southern secessionists.94 That interpretation is nevertheless unproven and probably wrong since al-Qaeda
has a strong presence in the south and is deeply desirous of striking at governmental targets. Under these
conditions, the mainstream Southern Movement’s
reputation for nonviolence remains relatively untarnished, at least for the time being.
Despite its regional popularity, the Southern
Movement appears to have a number of important
weaknesses that limit its ability to challenge the state
or even control its supporters. As noted above, the
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movement is highly diverse. There also appears to be
no organizational structures capable of serious coordination among the different groups seeking southern
independence. Moreover, most of the organizations
within the Southern Movement receive only limited
funding and outside assistance from Yemenis working
abroad. In particular, Yemeni expatriate sympathizers
working in the Gulf are usually blocked from contributing by financial regulations in their host countries.
Moreover, support from foreign countries appears
nonexistent.95 While accepting funds from foreign
countries is almost always a bad idea, the absence of
alternative income has led to a clearly impoverished
political movement. Additionally, some leaders of the
Southern Movement are reported to be concerned that
the government’s cease-fire with the Houthis will allow them to move more decisively in repressing the
struggle for southern independence.
One of the most prominent Southern Movement
leaders to emerge in recent years has been Sheikh Tariq
al-Fadhli. Fadhli is an important former ally of President Saleh who participated in the anti-Soviet war in
Afghanistan during the 1980s and did not associate
himself with the Southern Movement until 2009. He
is sometimes described as a former bin Laden associate, and even as an “old friend.”96 Fadhli denies these
characterizations, maintaining that while he did meet
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, they were never
close. He also insists that he fought against the Soviets
beside local Afghan guerrilla commanders, and not as
a bin Laden confidant or subordinate. Fadhli has denounced bin Laden’s international terrorist activities,
and also stated that Yemen needs a positive relationship with the West.97 To underscore this point, he had
himself videotaped raising an American flag at his
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family compound in southern Yemen and placed the
scene on the Internet.98 Such antics are difficult to take
seriously, and even if Fadhli has given up on jihadist
radicalism, he remains an inherently more violenceprone figure than other southern leaders.
While Fadhli’s unsavory past may be troubling for
many of the Southern Movement’s leaders, he is not
their most serious public relations headache. The most
serious problem developed in May 2009, when Nasser
al-Wahayshi, the leader of al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen—al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—
proclaimed his organization’s support for southern
independence.99 In the same statement, the al-Qaeda
leader sternly warned southerners that Marxism was
a failed ideology, and that it could not provide any
useful guidelines for achieving their goals. Only jihad
could lead them to victory.100 Wahayshi's support for
the south was correspondingly conditional and can be
interpreted as a demand for southern acceptance of
al-Qaeda leadership for their struggle.
Such demands are disconcerting and repellent to
most of the southern leadership at this time, and none
of the mainstream groups within the Southern Movement have shown any interest in working with al-Qaeda or adopting its tactics. Instead, they are alarmed
about the potential for the government to capitalize
on al-Qaeda statements of solidarity to convince the
international community that a serious link exists.101
Such perceptions could be used by the government to
justify increased repression in the south with much
less fear of an international backlash. Some activists claim that the government is already arresting
southern independence supporters on trumped up
charges of working with al-Qaeda.102 Southern Movement leaders may also fear that hotheads in their own
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organization might eventually be attracted to al-Qaeda if they remain unable to show results for their nonviolent efforts.
President Saleh has stated that his government is
willing to engage in dialogue with “pro-unity elements
[in the south] who have legitimate demands. But we
don’t have dialogue with separatist elements.”103 This
offer is underscored by the government’s continued
reference to the entire Southern Movement as composed of terrorists or agents of foreign powers.104
While the president cannot reasonably deny the existence of large anti-government demonstrations in the
south, he often claims that the problems bedeviling
southerners are more economic than political, and that
these problems exist in the north as well. Additionally,
any official discussion of casualties at southern rallies
inevitably minimizes violence against the demonstrators and instead emphasizes police and security forces
casualties.105
YEMENI REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE
RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia is Yemen’s most important and influential neighbor, and Yemen’s future is deeply tied to
that of this regional power. The relationship between
the two countries is currently strong, although there
have been serious tensions between them that have
sometimes damaged their bilateral relations. Major
events in Yemen almost always have important repercussions in Saudi Arabia, and the Riyadh leadership
is deeply aware of this dynamic on issues as diverse
as terrorism, the future of Iraq, and even democratic
or semi-democratic elections in Yemen. The Saudis
sometimes view such elections by neighboring states
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as a bad example for their own citizens. In this regard, many Saudis seem to view Yemen as a special
sphere of influence where Riyadh’s concerns trump
those of any other outside power. Saudi Arabia has
provided subsidies directly to various Yemeni tribes
for a number of years without bothering to go through
the Sana’a government, thus effectively establishing
itself as a separate sovereign capable of providing or
withdrawing patronage.106 Riyadh also supports various religious institutions that favor its version of Islamic orthodoxy. Yemen’s desperate need for foreign
aid has prevented Sana’a from challenging this sort of
meddling. In this regard, Saudi foreign aid has also
been provided directly to the government of Yemen
and is often more extensive than that provided by any
other country. It dwarfs the amounts provided by the
United States.107
The current close but somewhat uneasy relations
between a formal republic and an absolute monarchy
have taken a considerable period to forge. After the
official end of the North Yemen Civil War in 1970,
Sana’a maintained an acceptable relationship with
Saudi Arabia until 1990 when Yemen’s leadership
supported Saddam Hussein in the crisis leading up
to the 1991 Gulf War. Although Yemen halfheartedly
condemned Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait, it also opposed
the anticipated U.S.-led invasion to liberate that country. At that time, Yemen was a nonpermanent member
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and
its diplomatic actions assumed an importance and
level of visibility that was exceptional for the Sana’a
government. As the only Arab country then serving
on the UNSC, Yemen resisted calls for the use of force
against Iraq, called for an undefined “Arab solution”
to the conflict, and condemned Saudi Arabia for in-
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viting foreign troops into the kingdom.108 Most, if
not virtually all, of Yemen’s government leaders and
members of the public were solidly opposed to a UN
resolution calling for “all necessary means” to oust
Saddam from Kuwait. Many Yemeni officers admired
Saddam Hussein, and those who had undergone military training in Iraq were often especially opposed to
the potential invasion.109 President Saleh found such
sentiment extremely difficult to ignore, and attempted
to avoid offending domestic public opinion by tilting
toward Iraq. Moreover, on a geostrategic level, the
Saleh government worried that a defeated Iraq would
leave Saudi Arabia disproportionately powerful on
the Arabian Peninsula, and that such a development
could allow the Saudis to dominate Yemen on its key
domestic and foreign policies. The Yemeni president
apparently believed that he could maintain a good
deal more autonomy by maneuvering between the
two major Gulf Arab powers rather than by attempting to convince one dominant regional state of the
need to help him address Yemen’s problems.
Riyadh viewed Yemen’s pro-Saddam policies as
a betrayal even prior to the UNSC vote authorizing
the use of force against Iraq. Many Saudis believed
that they had been extremely generous with Yemen,
and that Sana’a’s support of their enemies at a time
of crisis required punishment. On September 19, 1990,
Riyadh acted on this anger, revoking the special status
of Yemenis allowed to work within Saudi Arabia.110
This change led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the kingdom, forcing their
return to Yemen. Various other Gulf monarchies followed the Saudi example, with many expelling their
Yemeni workers to please Riyadh and because they
were also angry that Yemen appeared to be siding
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with an expansionist Iraq. The Yemeni government
then made matters worse for itself internationally by
voting with Cuba against UNSC Resolution 678, which
authorized the U.S.-led coalition to use “all necessary
means” to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.111
This UNSC resolution passed despite Yemeni opposition, and Saddam’s value as a regional ally evaporated after Iraq’s massive defeat in early 1991. By 1991
over 800,000 Yemenis had returned home after losing
their jobs abroad.112 This setback deeply crippled the
always troubled Yemeni economy. Remittances sent
by workers to their families in Yemen had previously
brought at least one billion dollars per year into the
country throughout much of the 1980s, but now dried
up.113 In Yemen, food prices quadrupled, and unemployment reached around 35 percent, thus ensuring
that virtually every Yemeni household was hurt by
the disaster.114
The leadership of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states remained hostile towards Yemen in the years immediately following Operation DESERT STORM. When
asked about President Saleh in 1994, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister bluntly stated, “He is another Saddam
Hussein.”115 This was an overstatement, of course, but
one that clearly reflected the sense of betrayal some of
the Gulf Arabs felt. Although Saudi support may have
been mostly rhetorical, they took the surprising step of
siding with the southern Yemeni secessionists in the
1994 civil war despite the Marxist orientation of many
of their leaders. Publicly, the Saudis and their Arab
allies supported a UN call for a Yemeni ceasefire and
a mediated end to the conflict, policies which could
be expected to head off an impending northern military victory.116 Riyadh may have also surreptitiously
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provided more tangible forms of support including
weapons and funding, but little evidence exists of such
actions. According to a leading scholar of the region, a
number of the Gulf monarchies, including Saudi Arabia, allocated funds for weapons and other material
support for the southern secessionists, but failed to
provide this support to the rebels before their resistance collapsed.117 The primary Saudi motivation for
providing even limited support for the south seems
to have been a desire to continue punishing President
Saleh for his 1990-91 actions and perhaps to support
the division and hence weakening of a potential regional adversary. The Saudis may also have reacted
angrily to Saddam Hussein’s strong rhetorical support for Saleh’s efforts to maintain the Yemeni union
by force.118 Riyadh’s policies had little, if any, impact
of the outcome of the war since it apparently failed to
provide weapons.
Saleh’s continuing ability to remain in power following the 1991 war eventually caused the Gulf Arab
monarchies to moderate their position of unrelenting
hostility toward Sana’a. One key reason for this change
was that the Saudis, and especially the Kuwaitis, by
the mid-1990s were willing to engage in limited outreach to Arab states that had tilted towards Iraq during the 1990-91 crisis and war.119 This approach was
implemented in the hope of permanently realigning
them away from Ba’athist Iraq. By this time, the Gulf
leaders understood that Saddam Hussein remained
entrenched as Iraq’s dictator despite his 1991 defeat,
and that he was therefore unlikely to be overthrown
by Iraqi moderates seeking better relations with other
regional states. Thus, the leaders of the Gulf Arab
monarchies sought to ensure that Iraq was isolated
from potential sources of political support in any fu-
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ture conflict. That concern meant that relations with
Yemen had to be placed on a more normal footing. Aid
links were slowly expanded and efforts were made to
move forward on bilateral problems.
A number of Yemeni workers were able to return
to Saudi Arabia in the second half of the 1990s, and by
2000 some estimates reached as high as 500,000.120 This
number included Yemenis who made special arrangements with Saudi authorities to return, as well as some
who were exempted from deportation or had otherwise evaded the requirement to leave Saudi Arabia.
This number does not seem to have expanded dramatically since that time as most Yemenis remained confined to unskilled jobs, especially in the construction
sector, and minor shopkeeping under the sponsorship
of a Saudi citizen. As Saudi Arabia’s labor needs have
evolved and a more sophisticated workforce has become important, poorly-educated Yemenis have had
less to offer.121 Their most important asset for future
work is that they are willing to do hard manual labor
that is of no interest to Saudis, although fewer of these
jobs are available than in the past. In recent years, the
Saudi leadership may also have become concerned
about the dangers of increasing numbers of Yemenis
in the kingdom for security reasons.122 The limitations
on Yemeni workers allowed to enter Saudi Arabia remain a source of disagreement between the two countries.
A key turning point in improved Saudi-Yemeni
relations was seen at the 10-year anniversary celebration of Yemeni unity in May 2000. Saudi Crown Prince
(now King) Abdullah attended the event, and thereby
became the first Saudi leader to be present at such a
function.123 This action also signaled Riyadh’s acceptance of the unification of the two countries which it
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had previously opposed. Another fairly solid indication of the improvement in Saudi-Yemeni relations
took place shortly afterwards on June 12, 2000, when
the leaders of the two countries signed a bilateral treaty in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on international land and
sea borders, expanding upon the Taif Treaty of 1934.124
The Jeddah Treaty was announced on the first full day
of an official visit by President Saleh to Saudi Arabia.
As such, it indicated a significant improvement in Saudi-Yemeni relations, and it also dramatically reduced
the danger of future confrontations along the border.
As late as 1997, border skirmishes had occurred between the two states with Saudi and Yemeni solders
engaging in armed conflict. In December 1997 several
soldiers died in such a confrontation.125
Relations between the two states have continued
to improve at a steady pace since the signing of the
Jeddah Treaty in 2000. The Saudis have been one of
Yemen’s most generous aid donors since at least 2006
when they pledged $1 billion dollars in aid, and Saudi
Arabia, as noted, is currently Yemen’s largest regional
supplier of aid.126 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s GCC
partners also provide smaller, but still significant,
levels of aid to Yemen. In March 2010, this trend was
especially clear at a “Friends of Yemen” conference in
Dubai where the GCC states pledged to provide the
Yemenis with at least $3.7 billion in aid.127 Even in this
environment, however, tensions can persist, and some
Yemenis suspect that the Saudi leadership would like
to maintain a status quo whereby Yemen is weak,
impoverished, and dependent upon Saudi largess.128
Such weakness would allow the Saudis to dominate
Yemeni politics on issues of importance to the Saudis.
While there may be some truth to this argument, Yemen is hardly in a good situation to refuse support
from any friendly country, even if Riyadh, with its
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own agenda, can be somewhat overbearing and intrusive at times.
Along with the provision of foreign aid, the Saudi
leadership maintains an especially watchful eye on
Yemeni efforts to deal with various national security problems that could expand to include their own
country. The example of the Houthi rebellion is especially notable, since Saudi Arabia became embroiled
in large-scale combat operations in Yemen against the
Houthis on the side of the Sana’a government in 2009.
One author suggests that President Saleh manipulated
Saudi fears of Shi’ite empowerment to gain Riyadh’s
support for his own conflict with the Houthis, which
may not have required such an overwhelming Saudi
response to protect its interests.129
There may be some truth to this charge, but Riyadh does not have to be pushed particularly strongly
to become concerned over Shi’ite political assertiveness. Saudi fears entail not only their deep disapproval of Shi’ite religious doctrine but also involve the
recently intensified Saudi rivalry with Iran.130 Iran’s
increased political role in the Gulf since 2003 is often
viewed throughout the region as a reflection of Tehran’s power-based ascendancy.131 In some of its worst
nightmares, Riyadh worries about Iran and a Shi’itedominated Iraq collaborating again in future conflict
involving political subversion and proxy struggles.
Yemeni government accusations, if perceived as credible, that the Houthis seek to restore a Shi’ite imamate
with strong ties to Iran would consequently be of the
utmost concern to the Saudi leadership. Such charges
may even raise Saudi fears of encirclement by radical
Shi’ite enemies. Moreover, official charges of Iranian
involvement with the Houthis have been unrelenting.132 For its part, Tehran denies providing material
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support to the rebels, and Sana’a has not been able to
produce evidence that clearly substantiates its accusations.
There is also the problem of al-Qaeda. From 2003
until 2009, the Saudis fought a prolonged and bloody
war with the local branch of the AQAP. Many of the
small arms and explosives used by the terrorists in this
campaign were smuggled from Yemen, where military
grade weapons are seldom difficult to obtain.133 Saudi
coordination with Yemeni officials was therefore useful in the development of anti-terrorism strategies.
Such coordination was to become even more important after January 2009, when the Yemeni branch of alQaeda announced major structural changes as a result
of the al-Qaeda organization’s defeat within Saudi
Arabia by that country’s security forces.
At that time, the Saudi organization and Yemen’s
al-Qaeda in the Southern Arabian Peninsula (AQSAP)
merged into one organization which retained the Saudi name of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. AQAP
fighters remaining in the kingdom were advised
to flee and regroup in Yemen on the understanding
that al-Qaeda military operations against the Saudi
government would continue from there. This message may have simply formalized a trend which had
already been occurring since 2007, when increasing
numbers of Saudi jihadists found it sensible to flee
their homeland for Yemen.134 The merger of the two
branches of al-Qaeda led to a reinvigoration of the terrorist organization in Yemen, even while the al-Qaeda
movement accepted the weakening of its presence in
Saudi Arabia (which they viewed as temporary). The
merger also raised the possibility that Saudi radicals
with strong fundraising skills would help obtain significant additional resources for the newly merged

41

movement at levels that would have stunned the Yemenis in the organization.135
The leader (emir) of the new al-Qaeda branch organization was Nasser al-Wahayshi, a Yemeni and
past junior aide to bin Laden in Afghanistan.136 A former Guantanamo prisoner and Saudi national, Saeed
al-Shihri became the deputy leader of AQAP. Al-Shihri had been released from Guantanamo Bay in 2007
and was placed in the Saudi rehabilitation program,
becoming one of the most high-profile failures associated with that program.137 Both of these men were
determined to continue the struggle against the Saudi
monarchy, despite the fact that the new organization
was now based in Yemen. Typically, they managed to
express this strategy in an insulting and condescending way when in August 2009, an AQAP internet
publication stated, “We concentrate on Saudi Arabia
because the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh is on
the verge of collapse [and he is about to] flee the land
of Yemen.”138
It would have perhaps been more accurate to state
that Saudi Arabia is a much larger prize for al-Qaeda
than Yemen, and victory in Saudi Arabia could be followed by success throughout the Gulf. Moreover, it
is also untrue to suggest that al-Qaeda was not interested in undertaking terrorist strikes against Yemen.
Rather, they were interested in mounting operations
against both Saudi and Yemeni governmental targets as subsequent events ultimately proved. AQAP
is nevertheless correct in indicating that the Saleh regime is facing a variety of serious challenges, and that
its survival is by no means assured.
Despite the destruction of al-Qaeda’s power base
in Saudi Arabia, AQAP mounted an extremely ambitious, but ultimately unsuccessful operation against
the Saudi royal family from Yemen in August 2009,
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when they attempted to assassinate Prince Mohammad bin Nayef. Prince Mohammad is the son of the
current Saudi Interior Minister and holds the key position of Director of Counterterrorism within the Ministry of Interior. As such, he is an important emerging
leader of Saudi Arabia’s next generation of leaders, as
well as a direct and active adversary of al-Qaeda. The
assassination attempt was well planned and professional. It involved a meeting between Prince Mohammed and Abdullah Hassan Tali al-Asiri, a supposedly
repentant 23-year-old militant who maintained that
he wanted to present the prince with a list of al-Qaeda
members in Yemen who wished to surrender and enter the Saudi rehabilitation program. Shortly after he
entered Prince Mohammed’s presence, al-Asiri set off
a concealed bomb.139 Prince Mohammed was not seriously injured in the effort, although his assailant was
killed instantly. A great deal of luck was apparent in
this outcome since virtually identical tactics led to the
deaths of seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials and one Jordanian intelligence officer in Khost,
Afghanistan, on December 30, 2009.
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
Al-QAEDA PRESENCE IN YEMEN
Osama bin Laden was born a Saudi citizen, although his father, Mohammed bin Laden, was born
in the village of al-Rubat in the southern Yemeni
province of Hadhramaut. This area is often described
as bin Laden’s ancestral home.140 The younger bin
Laden’s affinity for Yemen appears to have remained
strong throughout his career as the leader of al-Qaeda.
In the past, bin Laden has employed Yemeni jihadists
in a variety of positions of special trust including his
personal bodyguards, drivers, and other aides.141 The
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youngest of bin Laden’s wives is also a Yemeni from
the southern highlands of that country. Little is known
about her, but she became bin Laden’s fourth wife at
between 15 to 18 years of age sometime in 2000 about
a year before the September 11, 2001 (9/11) strikes.142
Bin Laden married her after agreeing to a divorce requested by one of his other wives.143 He did not select
the young bride himself but instead sent a Yemeni
aide to the Hadhramaut to find someone appropriate. It is likely that bin Laden sought a Yemeni as his
new fourth wife in the hopes of establishing kinship
ties that could benefit him in reaching out to important tribal and religious figures in Yemen.144 Various
other al-Qaeda members are reported to have married
Yemenis from Marib, al-Jawf, and Shabwa governorates, where al-Qaeda has been especially interested in
establishing a meaningful presence.145
It nevertheless appears that bin Laden has been
largely unsuccessful in using these marriage ties (as
well as his wealth and largess) to reach out to Yemen tribal leaders for tangible support beyond the
sheltering of some jihadist subordinates and allies.146
Certainly, he had received significantly less such support than he sought from Yemeni tribal leaders whom
he may have hoped would help overthrow President
Saleh and replace him with a government allied with
al-Qaeda (such as the Taliban government in pre-9/11
Afghanistan). Unfortunately for bin Laden, important
Yemeni tribal leaders have never been interested in
confronting the Saleh government for his sake or that
of his movement. Conversely, they are sometimes willing to perform some services for al-Qaeda, including
sheltering terrorists, in exchange for funds. In these
instances, the motivations for helping bin Laden seem
to have be almost entirely financial, and not ideological.147
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Relations between bin Laden and the Yemeni government (like those between bin Laden and the Saudi
government) found a solid basis for cooperation during the 1980s before the international jihadist movement rose to prominence. During President Saleh’s
early years as the leader of North Yemen, bin Laden
had not yet publicly embraced the theories of global
revolution and a restored Islamic caliphate that were
later to dominate his thinking and behavior, though
both men were concerned about the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. During the anti-Soviet guerrilla war in
Afghanistan (1979-88), the Yemeni government cooperated with bin Laden’s representatives who helped
recruit young men to travel to Afghanistan and participate in that struggle.148
Yemen’s government considered fighting against
Soviet troops occupying a Muslim country to be an
honorable and natural course for those youths, many
of whom had few other viable opportunities at home.
In this supportive political environment, Yemen provided more Arab fighters to the struggle against the
Soviets in Afghanistan than did any other country except Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni combatants were
much tougher than the Saudis. 149 Yemeni fighters participating in the conflict may have numbered in the
tens of thousands.150 While most of the Arab international forces were not particularly effective in waging
war against Soviet troops (especially when compared
to indigenous Afghan fighters), Yemeni fighters did
nevertheless undergo military training and participated in a variety of skirmishes and a few battles. These
often poorly educated individuals also received extensive political indoctrination, as well as the opportunity
to associate with radicals from many other countries.
Politically, Yemeni fighters were among bin Laden’s
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most committed supporters recruited for service in
the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.
Another key reason bin Laden was able to recruit
so many Yemenis was his skillful effort to reach out
to youths from former landowning families who had
fled from the Marxist PDRY regime and established
a marginal existence in either North Yemen or Saudi
Arabia.151 Because of their own searing experiences in
southern Yemen, many of these aggrieved young men
were receptive to recruitment by any Islamist organization opposed to secularism and communism. Upon
coming to power, the PDRY government had adapted
an orthodox communist attitude toward religion as a
fraudulent and anti-modern force. This worldview led
to intermittent government persecution of Islamic figures and the destruction of religious sites, especially in
the early 1970s. At the height of this persecution, the
graves of prominent theologians (sometimes carelessly described as “Islamic saints”) were desecrated, and
some clerics and Islamic scholars were murdered.152
Conservative young men who fled South Yemen to
serve later in al-Qaeda therefore directed their fierce
anti-communism and religious devotion to serve bin
Laden’s objectives. They also viewed the bin Laden
family’s roots in southern Yemen with great favor.
Many Yemeni recruits further hoped that the war in
Afghanistan would be preliminary to an effort to retake their homeland in South Yemen.
Bin Laden probably encouraged followers to view
South Yemen as a likely center of future guerrilla operations. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan allowed him to focus elsewhere, bin Laden displayed much interest in ousting the PDRY’s Marxist
government and replacing it with his version of an
Islamist government.153 He may even have promised
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his Yemeni subordinates that he would make military
operations within South Yemen a priority upon the
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Such a promise
would have been sincere. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the future terrorist leader
was looking for new heroic struggles and had no desire to fade away quietly as a nonentity in his family’s
construction business. Moreover, in August 1988, he
and other like-minded leaders formed al-Qaeda, although the organization’s more sweeping purposes,
and even its name, were then enshrouded in secrecy.154
At this time, bin Laden may have believed that his
forces played a major military role in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, although more objective analysis
suggests that the combat activities of these forces had
little real impact on the outcome of the war.155 Such
beliefs would have fed his dreams of playing a major role on the world stage with the destruction of the
Arab World’s only communist regime serving as an
ideal stepping stone to larger concerns. In line with
such thinking, in 1989 bin Laden approached Prince
Turki al-Feisal, the head of Saudi intelligence, offering
to lead and help fund a new struggle against the PDRY
in cooperation with the Saudi intelligence services.156
The Riyadh leadership, which detested the PDRY and
did not yet consider bin Laden a criminal, may have
seriously considered the offer but ultimately decided
against such an effort. Saudi leaders had already come
to believe that bin Laden was difficult to control and
may not have favored the idea of a private guerrilla
army operating outside of their direct control in Yemen.157
Bin Laden found the Saudi royal family’s response
to his offer on South Yemen to be a bitter disappointment, but this was not to be his most serious disagree-
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ment with the leadership. Instead, the estrangement
reached a breaking point in 1990 when the Riyadh
government allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in
their country as a response to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Bin Laden began openly and fiercely criticizing the Saudi government and was allowed to go
into exile in Sudan in 1992. At this time, he became increasingly comfortable operating behind the backs of
Saudi security officials, and in 1994 his Saudi citizenship was revoked for funding subversive activities in
several Arab countries, including Egypt and Yemen.
Previously, around the time of Yemeni unification in
1990, bin Laden had helped to fund a terrorist training facility in southern Yemen’s Abayan province in
apparent defiance of Prince Turki’s instructions.158 Bin
Laden disapproved of Yemeni unification because of
the initial inclusion of a number of southern communists in high government posts. After unification, a
campaign of assassination took place in the south in
which some 100 officials with ties to the Yemeni Socialist Party were killed or wounded. While the identities of the assassins were uncertain for some time,
it later became clear that the killers were jihadists returned from Afghanistan, at least some of whom were
probably associated with bin Laden.159
Throughout the early 1990s, President Saleh’s government generally viewed Yemeni jihadists returning
from Afghanistan 1990s as brave and honorable men
who were not to be subjected to any special scrutiny
or surveillance as occurred in other Arab nations such
as Jordan.160 Abu Musab al-Suri, a leading al-Qaeda
military theorist and intellectual, even went so far as
to refer to Yemen as a “safe haven” for jihadis in the
years immediately following the Soviet-Afghan war.161
After Yemeni unification in May 1990, President Saleh
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also viewed the Islamist Afghan war veterans as a useful political counterweight to southern Marxists in his
policies of playing off conflicting groups against each
other to remain in power. The value of these veterans
to the Yemeni government later increased when up to
three brigades of Yemeni jihadists were employed as
auxiliaries of the Yemeni army during the 1994 civil
war. This force made an important contribution to the
rapid northern victory against southern secessionists,
and many of the jihadists were rewarded with military, security, and other government jobs after the war
ended.162 Others left Yemen and volunteered for service to al-Qaeda in the Afghan civil war on the side of
the Taliban.163
Other jihadists and Afghanistan veterans did not
leave Yemen and refused to be co-opted by the Yemeni government. These individuals engaged in activities within Yemen that were to become the seeds of
serious problems later. Such actions included making
plans to undertake terrorist activities against Western
targets. Al-Qaeda is believed to have maintained a
meaningful presence in Yemen since at least the early
1990s. The first al-Qaeda terrorist attack against Westerners may have been a coordinated strike at two hotels in Aden, Yemen, in 1992. These attacks appear to
have been aimed at killing American soldiers travelling to their duty station in Somalia, but instead killed
an Australian tourist and two Yemenis.164
In the strike, al-Qaeda seems to have been coordinating with an organization known as the AdenAbyan Islamic Army (AAIA). The AAIA was led
by Abu Hassan al-Mihdar, a Yemeni veteran of the
Soviet-Afghan War, and its leadership shared many al
Qaeda values and goals including, and most especially, its opposition to U.S. influence in the region.165 The
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AAIA set up at least one training camp in southern
Yemen, and in 1998 kidnapped 16 Western hostages,
four of whom were killed in a shootout between the
AAIA and the Yemeni army.166 AAIA may have taken
the lead in this attack, with al-Qaeda’s endorsement.
Cable News Network (CNN) reporter Peter Bergen,
who researched bin Laden’s activities in Yemen well
before 9/11, suggests that Tariq al-Fadhli may have
been al-Qaeda’s senior man in Yemen at this time and
could also have been involved in the strikes.167
Al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based operatives appear to
have provided some support for the August 7, 1998,
terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, although no Yemenis directly participated
in the attacks.168 Some studies suggest that the AAIA
may have cooperated with al-Qaeda in the attack on
the USS Cole in October 12, 2000, noting that the strike
may have been designed to coincide roughly with the
execution of a captured AAIA leader by the Yemeni
government.169 Even if this is true, al-Qaeda dominated the attack on the U.S. warship, and bin Laden
personally supervised the assault, including the
choice of target, selection of the operatives, funding of
expenses, and overruling of local recommendations.170
Local operatives initially envisioned the attack as using an explosives-laden boat to attack a commercial
ship in Aden harbor. Viewing such a plan as too timid,
bin Laden directed them to strike against an American warship, which ultimately was the destroyer, USS
Cole. While the Cole was not sunk in the attack, it did
have a large hole torn open on one side, with 17 sailors
killed and 40 wounded. The AAIA, for its part, continues to exist and is usually considered to be al-Qaeda
affiliated, although its importance has been almost totally overshadowed by al-Qaeda.171 Both groups were
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viewed as problems by the Yemeni government in the
aftermath of this event, but not major security threats.
While the embassy bombings and the Cole attack
were important, al-Qaeda’s strikes against the twin
towers and the Pentagon on 9/11 were dramatically
more significant. No Yemeni citizens directly participated in the 9/11 strikes against the United States, despite their importance within al-Qaeda strategy, but
this was not because of a lack of trust on bin Laden’s
part for his Yemeni subordinates. Rather, the terrorist
leader considered Yemenis travelling on their country’s passports to be a poor choice for service in terrorist strikes against New York and Washington. Bin
Laden feared that individuals with Yemeni passports
would stand out in any U.S. security screening process in ways that Arabs from countries more closely
aligned with the United States would not. Nevertheless, there was a more subtle Yemeni link in these operations since Saudis of Yemeni descent filled at least
five of the “muscle” hijackers positions in the 9/11
attacks.172 These individuals often came from areas
within Saudi Arabia that were more culturally akin
to Yemen than Riyadh. The choice of such people for
hijacking roles may have reflected a bin Laden belief
that al-Qaeda members of Yemeni heritage are often
more suited to tasks involving force and intimidation
than other Saudi Arabians.
The 9/11 strikes changed everything about how
the Yemeni government viewed al-Qaeda. Whereas
prior to the attacks President Saleh seemed to consider
them one more distasteful faction to be manipulated
and played against other enemies, they had now become instigators of a major crisis that required a fundamental reexamination of key Yemeni foreign and
domestic policies.173 Saleh understood the dangers for
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his regime presented by the 9/11 strikes and was concerned about the “with us or against us” rhetoric of
the Bush administration. Yemen’s reputation of laxity
with Islamic militants and earlier U.S. disappointment
over the level of cooperation on the USS Cole investigation suggested the possibility of serious emerging
problems with the United States unless the government generated some newfound support for the U.S.declared war on terrorism. Consequently, Saleh opted
for a more unambiguous alignment with Washington
in the struggle against al-Qaeda. In January 2002,
around 600 potentially dangerous foreigners studying
Islam at Yemeni institutions were deported.174 Even
more significantly, in 2002 six al-Qaeda terrorists,
including several key leaders in Marib, Yemen, were
killed in what the Yemeni government has now admitted to have been an authorized U.S. Predator drone attack.175 Among the dead was Qaid Sinan al-Harithi, the
head of the al-Qaeda branch, then known as al-Qaeda
in Yemen. According to journalistic sources, the strike
was expected to remain a secret, but broad hints of
U.S. involvement made by a senior U.S. official during
a CNN interview caused the cover story to collapse.176
The U.S.-Yemeni struggle against al-Qaeda nevertheless continued, and in November 2003, Yemeni security forces captured Muhammed al-Ahdal, who was
then al-Harithi’s replacement as the head of al-Qaeda
in Yemen.177 In 2004, with the al-Qaeda problem seemingly minimized and contained, the Yemeni government became much more focused on its conflict with
the Houthis, while Washington directed its attention
at problems associated with managing violence in
post-Saddam Iraq.
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Yemeni jihadists also directed at least some of
their attention to Iraq shortly after the 2003 invasion.
The number of Yemenis who fought in Iraq as supporters of al-Qaeda after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of
that country is uncertain, but many Yemenis were given ample opportunity to fight in that country if they
wished to do so. In the initial stages of the Iraq War,
when public fury over the invasion was still white hot,
Yemen’s government maintained a tolerant approach
to militants going to Iraq, doing little to prevent them
from leaving for Iraq while not punishing them upon
their return. The Yemeni government also did not prevent various radical clerics, including the very prominent Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, from openly
encouraging young men to travel to Iraq to join the
fighting.178
Additionally, the activist Islamist organization,
al-Hikma al-Yemania, was reported to have helped recruit and transport would-be fighters, although this
organization strongly denies any links to al-Qaeda or
involvement in supplying recruits to fight in the Iraq
War.179 Cell phone videos of al-Qaeda units fighting
in Iraq have been reported to be an important recruiting tool for al-Qaeda cells in Yemen.180 Some estimates
state that as many as 2,000 Yemeni fighters participated in the fighting for the first 7 years of the war, but
this figure seems high, considering that the total number of non-Iraqi jihadists was seldom more than 300 at
any one time, according to most reliable estimates.181
The Sinjar documents captured by U.S. forces in Iraq
(the so-called “al-Qaeda rolodex,” which discusses
only a portion of foreign jihadi activities within a limited timeframe) mention 48 Yemenis who crossed into
Iraq from Syria near the area where the documents
were seized.182
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THE INTENSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF
THE Al-QAEDA THREAT IN YEMEN
The al-Qaeda threat within Yemen seems to have
revived and intensified around 2006. One of the reasons frequently given for this change is that a group
of 23 experienced and resourceful terrorists escaped
en mass from a Yemeni Political Security Organization
(PSO) prison in February 2006. The escape of these
individuals appeared suspiciously easy, and skeptics
have suggested that the escape might have been facilitated by jihadist sympathizers within the PSO, or
even at the higher levels of the government. Such a
search for blame was probably inevitable, since the
2006 prison break has often been treated as an event of
seismic proportions for the revitalization of al-Qaeda
in Yemen. The importance given to this event is nevertheless surprising, owing to the limited number of
individuals involved in the escape. Moreover, not all
of these individuals had much of a chance to cause
additional trouble after they escaped. Within about a
year of the prison break, six of them were dead, and 11
had been returned to custody. Only six of the former
prisoners remained at large in Yemen.183 Consequently, there remains a clear need to look for additional
factors in al-Qaeda’s revitalization within Yemen.
Perhaps of greater importance than the 2006 prison
break in al-Qaeda’s revitalization were the developments in neighboring Saudi Arabia in the late 2000s.
By 2007, a number of Saudi terrorists were making
their way to Yemen, bringing much better financed terrorists into contact with the Yemenis. The announced
merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda
in January 2009 was naturally of the greatest concern to
the Sana’a government, underscoring the danger pre-
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sented by strongly revitalized al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. Yemeni authorities responded to this new threat
as best they could in the weeks immediately following
this declaration when the security forces rounded up
170 al-Qaeda suspects and other bad risks. These individuals were forced to sign pledges that they would
not engage in terrorism and then released to the supervision of their tribal leaders.184 While the pledges
themselves cannot be viewed as a serious deterrent,
they were an unmistakable warning to these individuals that they were under suspicion and could find
themselves facing long terms of imprisonment (if not a
death sentence) for future misbehavior. Likewise, the
tribal leaders involved in this situation are required to
guarantee the good behavior of individuals as a condition of their release into tribal custody. Such actions
may therefore have some value in preventing various
radicals and malcontents from drifting into al-Qaeda
activities, but are probably of limited effectiveness in
influencing the activities of hard-core terrorists.
Yemeni radicals may have been able, in part, to
rebuild their organization because in contrast to their
behavior in Saudi Arabia, the al-Qaeda forces in Yemen do not have a history of striking at civilians within
their own society, so long as those civilians are outside
of the government (although some have been killed
in crossfire or died in strikes on oil infrastructure).
Rather, al-Qaeda operations in Yemen are aimed at
the security forces and at foreign targets such as the
U.S. embassy, which was struck by mortar shells in
March 2008. In this instance, the shells fell short of the
embassy, but killed a guard and injured 13 students
at a nearby girl’s school.185 Two al-Qaeda members
were later apprehended and sentenced to death for
this action.186 A larger and much better planned attack
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occurred on September 16, 2008, when six al-Qaeda
operatives disguised as police officers attacked the embassy with car bombs, killing 16 people, including one
American. Another serious attack against the Western
diplomatic presence in Yemen occurred in April 2010
when an al-Qaeda suicide bomber attempted to kill
the British ambassador by targeting his car convoy in
Sana'a. The ambassador was unhurt, although three
bystanders were wounded and the bomber killed.187
The attempted assassination of a well-protected British diplomat is more an embarrassment for the Yemeni government than a crisis, since no United Kingdom
(UK) nationals were seriously injured or killed. But it
strikes once again at one of Yemen’s only promising
sources of future revenue, tourism, hurting the government without striking directly at the population.
It is doubtful that average Yemenis, with their own
problems, give much thought to such strikes.
There are also questions about the role that returning Yemeni jihadists from Iraq might have had on
al-Qaeda’s revitalization in Yemen. A Newsweek journalist, quoting unnamed sources, stated in 2008 that
returning fighters from Iraq had brought important
military and planning experience to al-Qaeda forces
in Yemen, and that their activities have been of intense
concern to the Yemeni government.188 These returning
radicals have been described as skilled at avoiding
surveillance and detection by the security police and
experienced enough in countersurveillance procedures to avoid obvious mistakes such as the use of cell
phones and emails. Additional journalistic sources
suggest that the car-bombing techniques used in the
September 2008 attack on the U.S. embassy represent
a new level of sophistication for Yemeni terrorists and
that such skills were probably learned in Iraq or So-
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malia rather than from the Internet.189 Yemeni security
officials later confirmed this, stating that several of the
captured attackers involved in the assault had fought
in Iraq.190 Such assessments appear reasonable since
al-Qaeda in Iraq was experiencing severe setbacks by
2007. According to the former head of the bin Laden
assessments desk at the CIA, al-Qaeda in Iraq specifically called upon al-Qaeda forces in Yemen to provide
more fighters to support the struggling Iraqi radicals.191 Such fighters were quickly promised as an act
of solidarity, but it is not known how seriously Yemeni
al-Qaeda members followed up on this request. There
also appear to have been a number of important internal changes taking place in al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch
as younger and more radical members of the organization, hardened by fighting in Iraq and elsewhere,
demanded that their leadership challenge the Saleh
government more directly.192 These younger fighters
were infuriated by the invasion of Iraq to a degree
that did not occur with most older leaders. They were
also much less forgiving towards Saleh’s cooperation
with the United States than their elders and, in many
cases, sought confrontation with the Yemeni government.193 Additionally, as the U.S. military presence in
Iraq continued, many Yemenis believed, or at least did
not discount, al-Qaeda propaganda about continuing
American atrocities committed against innocent Iraqi
civilians, thereby strengthening the radicals.
As noted earlier, one of the most well-known alQaeda operations took place on December 25, 2009,
when an operative trained in Yemen attempted to blow
up a Northwest Airline passenger jet with 280 people
aboard. In response, Yemen quickly announced that
it has arrested 29 people believed to be members of
al-Qaeda in a domestic crackdown on that organiza-
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tion.194 While it is doubtful that bin Laden or any of
his closest aides knew about the Christmas bombing,
the al-Qaeda leader’s endorsement of this operation
may help AQAP’s current leadership support their legitimacy within jihadist circles in Yemen.195 President
Obama responded to the bombing attempt by announcing a number of concerns about U.S. intelligence
procedures that had failed in this instance, stating that
the United States would begin pursuing solutions to
these difficulties. He also announced plans to expand
efforts to help the Yemeni government implement an
effective counterterrorism program. The President
further maintained that he had “no intention of sending U.S. boots on the ground” to Yemen (or Somalia)
as a result of this incident. He stated that “in countries
like Yemen, in countries like Somalia, I think working with international partners is most effective at this
point.”196 President Obama’s statement echoed earlier
remarks by U.S. military leaders, including Admiral
Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who asserted that sending U.S. combat troops to Yemen was “not a possibility.”197 Yet, these statements
were apparently not unequivocal enough for some
important Yemeni political figures, who noted that
the American political leader did not maintain that the
United States would never send troops to Yemen under any circumstances. Radical Sheikh Abdul Majeed
Zindani was particularly incensed, suggesting that
the U.S. leader had left the door open to possible military intervention in the future as part of an elaborate
conspiracy to declare Yemen a failing state and then
to seize its oil facilities, thus allowing “the return of
colonialism.”198
As the struggle against al-Qaeda escalated, Sana’a
lost its reputation for lenient treatment of radicals
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and become more willing to work with the United
States. A December 24, 2009, air strike was widely
described in the press as a U.S. Navy cruise missile
attack authorized by the Yemeni government to target
regional al-Qaeda leaders.199 The government of Yemen acknowledged an air strike but did not elaborate.
Unfortunately, key al-Qaeda leaders appear to have
evaded or survived the attack. Yemen again intensified its military operations against al-Qaeda in the
aftermath of the Christmas 2009 failed terrorist bombing, when President Saleh expressed concern about
more U.S. criticism of his inability to control terrorist
actions originating in his country. According to New
York Times journalist Robert Worth, Saleh was presented with “irrefutable evidence” in the fall of 2010
that AQAP was seeking to destroy the regime by assassinating him and his relatives.200 Worth maintains
that this development caused the Yemeni government
to move much more aggressively against al-Qaeda
forces.201 AQAP has responded to government operations with its own efforts to retaliate against the Saleh
government. Another audacious al-Qaeda operation
occurred on July 15, 2010, when approximately 20 alQaeda gunmen attacked the intelligence and security
headquarters in Zinjibar, the capital of the often restive
Abayan province.202 Three police officers were killed
in this hit-and-run attack, and 11 were wounded. Two
AQAP members were also killed and one wounded.
There are also emerging signs that AQAP operations against the government may be taking on a new
and more virulent form. In this regard, al-Qaeda has
sought to use the confrontation between the Yemeni
government and the Southern Movement to its advantage if at all possible. In mid-2010, AQAP launched
several high profile attacks against important govern-
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ment targets in southern Yemen, causing a number of
government casualties and probably embarrassing the
security forces.203 These attacks led to intensive government efforts to root out al-Qaeda forces in Aden,
including searches of a large number of individual
homes and the interrogation of many people.204 AQAP
attacks in areas where the Southern Movement is
strong may therefore seek to increase anti-government
alienation in the south, and some Southern Movement
activists already maintain that raids against al-Qaeda are used as cover to arrest members of their own
movement who have nothing to do with the AQAP
terrorists.205 Moreover, AQAP does not have to realign
the Southern Movement in any dramatic way to meet
a number of key goals. Rather, it only needs to gain a
trickle of recruits from the south and a widespread acceptance of its active presence in the southern portion
of the country.
The government may also have made matters
worse by suspending around 800 southern members
of the armed forces without pay in the summer of
2010.206 The reasons for the suspension have never
been clearly explained, but it is at least possible that
those suspended were deemed unreliable because of
their southern roots. Such individuals are trained in
military fields and have reason to feel aggrieved and
angry with the Yemeni government. If the trend of
purging southerners from the military continues, such
individuals could make an excellent talent pool for
AQAP to target in future recruitment campaigns. At
the present time, many southerners nevertheless remain concerned about the danger of al-Qaeda attracting the government’s military attention, including
bombing, to their region, so it is not clear whether alQaeda will make significant progress in the south.207
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As with many clandestine organizations, it is often difficult to discern how many members of AQAP
there are in Yemen. In December 2009, Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi stated that there
were probably around 200-300 al-Qaeda “operatives”
in Yemen.208 In May 2010, President Obama’s assistant
for homeland security echoed this assessment, stating
that there were probably several hundred al-Qaeda
members in Yemen.209 These estimates include only
full-time professional terrorists and not supporters or
sympathizers who might be brought into the organization at a later time. These potential terrorist recruits
probably number in the thousands or even the tens of
thousands. The 200-300 number might also be dated
since it is often difficult to track AQAP growth, which
occurs in two ways. The most straightforward way
is for additional Yemenis to choose to join AQAP for
whatever reasons might be compelling to them, probably disillusionment and anger with the Yemeni government or with local tribal leaders allied with that
government. The second way is for foreign radicals to
leave their own country or previous foreign bases of
operation and join up with al-Qaeda forces in Yemen.
This occurred most dramatically with Saudi radicals,
but there are also recurring claims that radicals from
Pakistan and Afghanistan may be moving their operations to Yemen in response to problems they are facing in those countries with local security forces and
U.S. drone attacks.210
The composition of AQAP may also be important
in evaluating its capabilities and resilience. In early
2010, Yemen’s National Security Agency director stated that around 90 percent of the al-Qaeda fighters in
Yemen are Yemeni nationals, and only around 10 percent foreigners.211 This appears to be an unlikely and
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lopsided estimate, implying that relatively few Saudi
members of al-Qaeda were able to reach Yemen after
their leadership advised them to do so. This estimate
also suggests that only a limited number of radicals
have arrived from Pakistan, although other statements by the security forces indicated that both Saudi
and Pakistani radicals in Yemen are a problem.212 This
evaluation may therefore be based on spurious information, but, if sincere, it indicates that Yemenis view
AQAP as primarily composed of domestic radicals.
Certainly, foreign radicals, including Saudis, would
have a difficult time surviving within Yemen without
help from Yemeni supporters, especially tribal leaders
who see financial advantages in sheltering the nonYemeni members of AQAP. This tribal involvement
would normally restrain al-Qaeda terrorists from selecting targets which, if attacked, could lead to serious government retaliation against a particular tribal
region. Nevertheless, a number of problems in Yemen
can be overcome with money.
While AQAP’s interest in spectacular acts of terrorism constitutes a frightening threat, it would be a
mistake to focus on these activities in ways that gloss
over the organization’s progress in challenging the
government within Yemen itself. Whereas AQAP has
often been viewed primarily as a terrorism organization, it may well be emerging as more than that now.
In particular, AQAP is potentially rising as an insurgent group willing to wage guerrilla war and contest
control of portions of the Yemeni hinterland with the
Yemeni government. One of the most dramatic indications of AQAP’s increased willingness to fight as an
insurgent force can be seen during August 2010 combat operations in the southern Yemen town of Loder.
At this time, AQAP established a strong presence in
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the town of 80,000 people to the point that the Yemeni
army felt required to distribute pamphlets requiring the residents to leave the urban center prior to a
forthcoming battle.213 Evacuating a town of this size
is seldom necessary to defeat a handful of terrorists.
Conversely, such a measure might be required to defeat a serious guerrilla force which the Yemeni army
seemed to be facing. In another problematic indicator,
the AQAP forces initially remained to contest control
of Loder rather than attempting to escape with the
departing civilians. These actions indicated a strong
level of commitment to their cause, as well as perhaps
some degree of contempt for the uncertain quality of
Yemeni military forces. Government forces ultimately
won the battle in Loder, but only after serious resistance by the militants that included the use of at least
one ambush with a rocket propelled grenade (RPG)
that killed 11 soldiers.214 The fighting lasted for several
days, and at least some AQAP members escaped.215
Heavy casualties were not reported on either side,
perhaps indicating that al-Qaeda was only attempting to make a limited political statement rather than a
bloody last stand.216 Such a withdrawal was probably a
wise operational move, since the Yemeni government
would eventually use artillery, airpower, and perhaps
tanks to break any stalemate involving ground forces.
The Loder battle does not appear to have been an
aberration; in September 2010, Yemeni Army units
were again engaged in urban combat against al-Qaeda
forces.217 This time, the fight occurred in the Yemeni
village of Hawta, which has a population of around
20,000 people. At least 8,000 of these people (and possibly a great deal more) were able to flee the village
during the fighting.218 Many others were prevented
from leaving by al-Qaeda so that their presence could
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help shield the terrorists from artillery and airpower
strikes, while complicating the tactical operations of
the Yemeni ground forces.219 This encounter was reported to have involved Yemeni army tanks and armored vehicles moving against an uncertain number
of al-Qaeda members.
A more persistent indication of AQAP’s growing assertiveness is its willingness to ambush or attack squad, platoon, and perhaps larger sized units of
the Yemeni army. On August 27, 2010, for example,
al-Qaeda militants with RPGs and machine guns attacked a group of soldiers near Zinjibar, the capital
of in Abyan province, while they were eating dinner
and killed 12 of them.220 Earlier the same day, one soldier was killed and three wounded while on patrol
in the southern province of Lahij.221 Police units are
also regularly attacked.222 In one September 2010 assault on the coastal town of Zinjibar, al-Qaeda attackers on motorbikes used hit-and-run tactics against two
separate police targets, indicating careful planning
and effective execution of a synchronized mission. In
this strike, the terrorists attacked police stations with
RPGs and automatic weapons, and then quickly fled
the area.223 Some of the gunmen were reported to have
been killed, while others escaped. AQAP also issued
a “death list” in September with the names of 55 military, judiciary, and police officials targeted for assassination.224 Such lists are a common feature of some
insurgencies and a warning to the named officials that
they must leave their posts or face death. Adding to
the uncertainty has been al-Qaeda’s occasional ability
to kill or kidnap very senior security officials throughout the country, suggesting that anyone they target
may be vulnerable.225
There are also some positive signs within Yemen’s
still halting efforts to control terrorism. In summer
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2010, some of Yemen’s tribal leaders in the areas south
and east of Sana’a seemed to be reevaluating their
views on the costs and benefits of sheltering al-Qaeda
suspects in their areas. The harboring of such fugitives led to Yemeni military raids into their territory,
and threatened to disrupt any patronage networks
providing funds from Sana’a or Riyadh. Thus, both a
key source of tribal income and overall security within
tribal areas were threatened. In response to this evolving situation, tribal leaders from the important Abida
and al-Ashraf tribes pledged that they would “stop
harboring people wanted by the security forces or
who are accused of belonging to al-Qaeda.”226 These
pledges are interesting and positive developments,
although the extent to which they are to be honored
remains uncertain.
U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES INVOLVING
YEMEN
Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership have
often viewed Yemen as having considerable potential
for serving as a safe haven, and also a country which
they might eventually provoke the United States into
attacking so that they could wage war against U.S.
military forces, such as they have done in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The al-Qaeda leadership at the highest
level has therefore shown a strong interest in inflicting “bleeding wars” on the United States and seems to
view Yemen as having considerable potential in this
regard.227 The Egyptian intervention in Yemen during
the 1960s is considered instructive in this regard. Egypt
has been reported as suffering up to 20,000 casualties
in unproductive fighting in North Yemen from 1962
through 1967.228 Perhaps with this precedent in mind,
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bin Laden and his senior lieutenants have continued to
view Yemen as a potential theater of war with a variety
of possibilities for crippling U.S. power in the region.
In this regard, Yemen seems similar to Afghanistan in
ways that are of interest to the al-Qaeda leadership.
The populations of both countries have a strong tribal
component, rugged terrain, and central governments
of limited capacity. Yemen, of course, does not, like
Afghanistan, have a neighboring country where alQaeda insurgents might easily take sanctuary. Additionally, bin Laden’s ability to influence events in
Yemen at the current time is quite limited. He cannot
overrule the indigenous AQAP leadership, and he is
almost certainly not informed of the operational plans
of the al-Qaeda radicals he has helped to inspire. AlQaeda forces in Yemen consider themselves to be their
own affiliated movement and not a subordinate organization with its headquarters outside of the country.
These individuals seem primarily interested in waging war against the Saleh regime at this time, although
they are also deeply opposed to the United States and
may continue to support terrorist actions against U.S.
targets both in general and in response to specific U.S.
activities in Yemen and the Middle East.
While the United States has dangerous and committed enemies in Yemen, its allies are much more tentative. The Yemeni leadership chose to ally itself with
the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 strikes
for a variety of reasons, including a fear that failure to
do so could lead the United States to view Yemen as
an enemy.229 President Bush is reported to have disliked President Saleh shortly after first encountering
him in a November 27, 2001 meeting, perceiving that
the Yemeni president remained an irritating, uncooperative, and unreliable ally.230 Specific U.S. complaints
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about Yemen centered on issues such as short, lenient
sentences for terrorists, rapid release for some terrorism suspects that the United States considered to be
especially dangerous, concealing information on Yemeni terrorist networks from the United States, and
a potential openness to negotiations with al-Qaeda.
Some U.S. policymakers have acidly referred to Yemeni security policy at various times as “catch and
release” for dangerous radicals.231 Many U.S. counterterrorism officials were especially concerned when the
Yemeni president refused to extradite two suspects in
the U.S.S. Cole bombing to the United States on the
grounds that there was no extradition treaty in place
between the two countries and that extradition was
prohibited by the Yemeni Constitution.232 This explanation sounded more like an excuse than a reason to
many U.S. security professionals on a matter that was
of considerable concern to the United States. Unfortunately, extradition seems to be yet another hot button
issue, indeed being forbidden by the Yemeni Constitution.233
The government of Yemen has often irritated U.S.
policymakers, but it also had its own reasons for limiting cooperation with Washington, including the ferocious anti-Americanism which can be ignited in that
country. In some respects, the potential strength of
anti-Americanism in Yemen is surprising. Yemen has
no direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
U.S. policies toward the Israelis and Palestinians have
virtually no practical impact on Yemen. The Yemenis
also maintain only limited links to Iraq, although the
Yemeni population was deeply opposed to both the
1991 and 2003 U.S.-led wars against that country. Nevertheless, the Yemeni population remains particularly
sensitive to the perception that the United States or
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any other foreign power is seeking to dominate their
country. Many Yemenis have a great deal of pride in
their heritage as citizens of a country which, at least
in the case of northern Yemen, was never ruled by a
Western power. Yemeni culture also encourages individuals to think in terms of affinities.234 Western observers have often noted the intense loyalty of Yemeni
strangers to each other when they are outside of their
own country. This affinity exists at the tribal, national,
and ethnic level. Arabs in dispute with the West, such
as Saddam Hussein, often seem to get the pronounced
benefit of the doubt in any confrontation.
Unfortunately, anti-American sentiment in Yemen
can have a strong impact on official policy, and Saleh’s
various efforts to limit cooperation with the United
States occurred in the context of a weak regime that
did not wish to implement unpopular policies. AntiAmericanism in Yemen has also manifested itself in
some volatile and unexpected ways. One incident
may be particularly instructive of this problem. It
has already been noted that a senior Bush administration official dropped hints that the November 3,
2002 deaths of six al-Qaeda militants was the result
of a U.S. Predator drone attack.235 This revelation was
made to the great anger of the Yemeni government,
reportedly undermining the cover story that both nations had agreed to put forward. Nevertheless, within
the U.S. leadership, any decision to make this information public was probably not seen as a disclosure
that would become a serious problem later. The U.S.
administration was cooperating with the Yemeni government and was never accused of deploying this
system without the government’s permission (Saleh
eventually admitted that it was deployed with his
permission).236 The Predator strike also seems like the
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lightest of light footprints. It served as a substitute for
a troop presence on the ground, and the strike in question produced no collateral damage. Yemeni sovereignty was not compromised, and no innocent people
were killed or even disturbed by this strike. Reasonable Western observers may have concluded that this
operation would not appear particularly controversial
in Yemen if it became publicly known. Yet, this was
not the case.
President Saleh initially reacted with angry denials of the Western reports of the Predator attack. The
Yemeni government continued to reject this version
of events for a year or so, but eventually stated that
the reports were true, and that Yemen had authorized
the United States to undertake this operation.237 The
Yemeni president’s admission came slowly and painfully in response to unyielding public criticism of both
the attack and the cover-up. This political confrontation seemed like an especially intense, and by Western standards perhaps unreasonable, response to a
single drone strike that was carefully managed so as
to avoid innocent casualties, but there were also some
special circumstances. While the Yemeni public has a
deeply ingrained distrust of the United States at almost any time, the strike did not come at an ordinary
time. In 2002 and early 2003, the public debate over
Saleh’s decision to authorize the U.S. Predator attack
occurred just as Washington was preparing to invade
Iraq. When the United States followed through on this
decision, the Yemeni public became virulently hostile
to any cooperation with the United States on security
issues. Large and angry street protests broke out in
Yemen in March 2003 in response to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq. Demonstrators reported to be in the “tens of
thousands” marched on the U.S. embassy and were
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stopped by Yemeni security forces, with at least four
dead.238 It remains an open question whether the Yemen public would have been more receptive to the
strike if it had occurred within a less sensitive time
frame. Whatever the case, the Yemeni political culture
remains deeply hostile to the concept of U.S. drones
being used for any purpose in Yemen even if it is with
the permission of the Yemeni government.239
In the current somewhat calmer regional environment, President Saleh is willing to acknowledge openly some military cooperation with the United States so
long as it involves joint activities that in no way imply
U.S. domination within the relationship. The Yemeni
government has publicly acknowledged that it receives military assistance from the United States. This
aid has expanded from a modest $4.3 million in 2006
to $66.8 million in 2009. General David Petraeus, then
serving as the U.S. Central Command Commander,
travelled to Yemen on July 26, 2009, as part of an effort to assess ways in which the United States might
support Yemeni counterterrorism efforts. In meetings
with President Saleh and other top officials, General
Petraeus confirmed that the Obama Administration
planned significant increases in aid to support counterterrorism efforts then going forward in Yemen.240
These increases were especially salient in the 2010 security assistance budget which authorized $155 million for Yemen, a dramatic increase over the previous
year.241 This funding is primarily aimed at improving
the weapons, equipment, and training of the Yemeni
forces. A sizable portion of the U.S. aid is being directed at bolstering elite counterterrorism units and
aviation assets. The aviation assets include transport
aircraft, four Huey helicopters, and a program to upgrade 10 Russian-made M-17 (“Hip”) helicopters al-
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ready in the inventory.242 These systems will be used
by the Yemeni military to transport special operations
troops when they are needed to provide a rapid response to an unfolding crisis such as those involving
AQAP. The counterterrorism troops are also being
supplied with 50 new tactical Humvees, night vision
goggles, and modern combat communications systems.243 To further support Yemen, President Obama
and a number of U.S. Government spokesmen have
publicly announced increased intelligence support for
that country.244 This is a form of aid that the Yemenis
seem comfortable acknowledging, and they have even
publicly requested additional U.S. intelligence backing. The Yemeni Foreign Minister al-Qirbi stated that
it was the “responsibility” of countries with strong
intelligence capabilities to warn countries such as Yemen about terrorist activities.245
While the current military relationship with the
United States has not always been well received by
the Yemeni public, the regime remains able to manage opposition to such ties. In an apparent response
to Saleh’s efforts to defuse any potential backlash,
Sheikh Zindani has not publicly opposed Sana’a’s
decision to accept U.S. training assistance and technological support. Rather, he has stated, “We accept
any cooperation in the framework of respect and joint
interests, and we reject military occupation of our
country [U.S. bases]. And we don’t accept the return
of colonialism.”246 Zindani thereby made a distinction
between receiving aid and training, and accepting a
military presence involving U.S. combat troops being
sent to Yemen to wage war against AQAP. Zindani’s
willingness to make such a distinction is clearly the
result of Saleh’s skills as a master politician, since it
is a position he would probably never take without
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prompting. Zindani has been identified as a “specifically designated global terrorist” by the U.S. Treasury
Department, which maintains that he had a long history of anti-American and pro-al-Qaeda activity.247
Saleh insists that the United States is mistaken about
the cleric’s involvement with past terrorist activity,
but is also loathe to confront him because of his strong
following in Yemen. Other radical clerics have called
for Yemen’s religious leadership to go further than
Zindani in opposing U.S. activities in Yemen. In an
audiotaped message, an individual claiming to be the
fugitive American-born cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, exhorted Yemeni religious leaders to expand their objections to U.S activities and called for the killing of any
American military or intelligence officials involved
with the training of Yemeni security forces. The tape
was made by a journalist in the course of what he
claims was an interview with Awlaki inside of Yemen.
It is widely believed to be authentic, although this has
not been verified by official sources.248
In July 2010, President Obama again stressed U.S.
solidarity with Yemen by praising that country’s determination to fight terrorist groups in a White House
press release issued following a telephone conversation between Presidents Obama and Saleh.249 In an
NBC interview, the President answered a question
about the relationship with the Yemeni government
regarding terrorism by stating, “They are cooperating.”250 This assessment is a reasonable description of
the current situation in Yemen, and for reasons already
noted, President Saleh may be significantly more willing to cooperate with the United States than he was
a few years earlier. Moreover, Saleh has now become
so deeply involved in the conflict with AQAP that he
cannot easily back away from it and treat al-Qaeda
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as though it were just another Yemeni political faction. The Yemeni president also knows that he needs
resources to pursue enemies that are much tougher
and more radical than they were a decade ago. Saleh
therefore continues to weigh carefully what he can do
and must avoid within the context of Yemeni political
culture. President Obama, for his part, has continued
to support Saleh beyond the issue of terrorism and
emphasized U.S. support for a unified Yemen.251
One remaining problem that is probably more
significant for Washington than Sana’a involves the
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detainees. In mid-2010,
the United States held over 100 Yemenis in custody
at Guantanamo Bay for terrorism-related offenses
with the final disposition of these prisoners remaining uncertain. President Obama has indicated that he
does not wish them to be returned to Yemen under
current circumstances for incarceration there. One
of the reasons for this decision involves the ongoing
security problems in Yemeni prisons and other detention facilities which manifested themselves in the
2006 jailbreak. In this case, the guards may have been
untrustworthy. A different set of problems was seen
in June 2010 when al-Qaeda fighters stormed a security facility in Aden, leading to the release of several
prisoners.252 Adding to these problems, the Yemeni
de-radicalization programs have largely been failures,
especially when compared with the much more successful Saudi programs. Riyadh’s de-radicalization efforts are extremely well-funded and make strong use
of Saudi tribal and family responsibilities to prevent
released prisoners from recidivism. Former terrorists
are also sometimes provided with a stipend to give
them an additional incentive to stay out of trouble. The
now-defunct Yemeni program, by contrast, was large-
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ly a program centered on detainees receiving religious
guidance from one Islamic judge who, while respected, did not seem to change many minds. Likewise,
the radicals enrolled in this program were expected
to sign pledges to support the Yemeni government.
These pledges had little, if any, value in the absence of
a more comprehensive agenda. Recognizing that this
program was not effective, Yemeni authorities discontinued it in 2005.253 The Yemeni government seldom
seems particularly concerned about getting its detainees back and may be satisfied to allow them to remain
in U.S. prisons.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems in Yemen defy easy answers and
are often viewed as so overwhelming that they can be
approached only in a tentative, trial-and-error manner. The United States must therefore remain aware of
the potential for the situation to get worse in Yemen
before it gets better. Moreover, Yemen’s security difficulties are so interrelated that it is difficult to solve
the al-Qaeda problem in any fundamental way without some progress in managing the other difficulties
in Yemen. President Obama’s statement that he has
“no intention” of sending troops to Yemen is reassuring to most Yemenis and indicates reasonable concern
over the danger of falling into a significant military intervention. Such an intervention would consume U.S.
lives and resources and could only make the security
situation in the region increasingly unstable. This
set of problems does not require the United States to
remain aloof from Yemen’s problems. Rather, it suggests that Washington’s involvement in Yemen must
be structured in ways that the political culture will
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accept. Unfortunately, for the time being the United
States may have to focus on helping Yemen contain or
manage problems rather than solve them.
The difficulties associated with managing Yemen
policy should nevertheless not be allowed to obfuscate the high stakes of the current situation in Yemen.
There are important reasons for defeating al-Qaeda in
Yemen, even if this does not destroy the organization
and instead leads it to move operations to more hospitable sanctuaries in remote parts of the world. Yemen is central in the struggle against al-Qaeda due to
its key strategic location, including a 700-mile border
with Saudi Arabia. It also dominates one of the region’s
key waterways, the Bab al-Mandeb strait, which controls access to the southern Red Sea. Furthermore, the
problem of Yemen-based terrorism remains an important international threat which cannot be ignored. The
U.S. leadership may have narrowly escaped unmanageable domestic pressure for an additional war in
the Middle East when the Christmas bomber plot was
thwarted in late 2009. If this incompetent enemy had
actually been able to detonate his explosives, the call
for a hard-line military response would have been difficult to resist. Yet, an actual invasion of Yemen would
have produced a vicious indigenous response that
would have been difficult to contain. Moreover, any
effort to rebuild, modernize, and democratize Yemen
in the aftermath of such an intervention would make
the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq look simple by
comparison. While paying special attention to Yemeni
sensitivities about foreign influence, the United States
must do what it can to prevent Yemen from falling
into a cauldron of radicalism before the subject of intervention even arises.
The Yemeni political system is likely to remain
unstable, and the economic system is likely to remain
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impoverished, for the foreseeable future. Central governmental authority in the hinterland can be expected
to remain limited for the foreseeable future. It is also
possible that the country could collapse into anarchy
over the next decade or so as the current problems continue to intensify. Helping Yemen manage these problems will be difficult since a constant distrust of U.S.
actions is always present in Yemeni politics. Within
this especially difficult milieu, this report makes the
following recommendations.
1. The United States must not seek to Americanize the conflicts in Yemen, and should avoid sending
major combat units there. However bad the situation may become in Yemen, Americanizing the war
against AQAP can only make it dramatically worse.
Yemeni public opposition to the presence of ground
troops with combat missions is almost universal, and
it is possible that large elements of the Yemeni public
would rise against their president and parliament if
the government invited the United States to provide
such forces. Certainly, the Yemeni clergy is particularly shrill on this subject, and this intensity goes far beyond the strident voices of well-known radicals such
as Sheikh Zindani. The United States should understand that an alliance with Yemen can only go so far,
and that the Yemeni government has good reasons for
limiting its public cooperation with the United States.
2. The United States needs to continue supplying
intelligence, training, and military equipment to Yemen so long as these assets directly support counterterrorism missions. So far, the United States has been
highly effective in tailoring its military aid to Yemen in
ways that focus on the needs of the counter-al-Qaeda
mission. Small units of elite troops with a rapid movement capability can be extremely effective in dealing
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with terrorists, although their ability to add capabilities to deal with problems in the Houthi areas or the
activities of the Southern Movement are much more
limited. Should AQAP be able to develop into a widespread and effective insurgent force, the United States
will have to expand aid in ways that are less counterterrorism focused. The United States will then have
do everything possible to avoid becoming viewed as
a party to Yemen’s other conflicts. The United States
must also structure its military support to Yemen in
ways that continue to enhance a long-term military relationship between the two countries and expose the
Yemenis to U.S. concepts of military professionalism.
Such an approach would include particular vigilance
in providing ongoing opportunities for Yemeni officers
to train in the United States in programs such as the
Professional Military Education (PME) courses. Such
courses give international officers an opportunity to
forge close relationships with American officers and
to consider the importance of respect for human rights
within a military context. To the extent possible, U.S.
military training programs and educational opportunities must also share relevant counterinsurgency
doctrine and expertise with the Yemeni military, and
help them rise above an “Operation Scorched Earth”
mentality.
3. The United States, and particularly the U.S.
military assistance program for Yemen, needs to
recognize and respond to the changing nature of the
al-Qaeda threat in Yemen. AQAP is no longer simply
a terrorist group, although that organization’s potential to do harm through spectacular acts of terrorism
remains undiminished. It is now an insurgent organization capable of waging sustained combat against
government forces. It is also apparently capable of es-
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tablishing itself in those territories where the government traditionally exercises little authority so long as
AQAP can co-opt or intimidate the local tribal leadership in these areas. This danger suggests that the United States may have to expand its military assistance to
Yemen, while maintaining as light a footprint as possible and avoiding the deployment of U.S. troops for
anything other than training. Military planners need
to consider ways to address the problems that may be
associated with an expanded aid program, while seeking continued input from those on the ground on how
such programs can be improved.
4. U.S. leadership must remain aware of the severe
limitations of the Yemeni government in controlling
its own territory, but it must also understand that
there are no serious alternatives to the Saleh regime
in dealing with the current threats to the region and
the world emanating from Yemen. The United States
must also maintain an ongoing and comprehensive
dialogue with the Yemenis on ways that al-Qaeda can
be defeated in Yemen. It might also be considered that
President Obama is more popular in the Arab World
than most previous American presidents due to his
well-received outreach efforts to the Muslim world.
It may be possible that Yemen will find cooperation
with President Obama to be less domestically controversial than cooperation with his predecessors.
5. The United States should continue to push for
peaceful solutions of the Sa’ada difficulties and the
Yemeni government’s problems with the Southern
Movement. The United States should not abandon its
support for a one-Yemen policy without strong and
ongoing provocation from the Yemeni government.
If it eventually does consider revising this policy, it
should do so only after careful discussions and coor-
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dination with regional allies. This is not because the
southern Yemeni cause is without merit, but rather because any U.S. intervention in sensitive internal issues
can sometimes create new problems for all involved
parties. The danger of the south fragmenting into a
series of competing mini-states also needs to be considered, as such a development could harm regional
security and provide al-Qaeda with increased opportunities for alliances and sanctuary. The key problem for the United States in leaving the issues of the
Southern Movement unaddressed is that the current
frustration of the southerners may lead to increased
radicalization over time. Al-Qaeda is clearly trying
to harness the energy of the Southern Movement for
its own ends. While most southerners seem repelled
by al-Qaeda, this may not continue for the indefinite future if frustration levels are allowed to rise. It
is therefore imperative that the Yemeni government
dramatically improve its governance activities in the
south and avoid policies that cause southerners to feel
exploited by the government.
6. The expansion of good governance in Yemen is
important, and any U.S. efforts to support this goal
need to be carefully considered in consultation with
Yemeni leaders. The Yemeni population has a number of needs that must be addressed in the short term
before democratic expansion becomes discussable.
There is deeply entrenched corruption in Yemen that
is part of the political culture. The United States has
not been able to halt the rampant corruption in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, and it cannot be expected to implement fundamental ameliorative changes
in Yemen. Nevertheless, ways need to be found to
reduce corruption to the point that the intentions of
important international aid projects are not subverted.
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7. The United States should support the work
of effective and trustworthy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Yemen. The United States
cannot solve the problem of al-Qaeda in Yemen with
development aid administered by U.S. personnel,
but it can certainly encourage and support the work
of responsible NGOs, and ask other developed countries to do the same. Their role is vital since there are
relatively few individuals in the Yemeni government
who can impartially administer well-funded development programs. Such programs will have to address a
myriad of economic problems in order to help Yemen
in a meaningful way. Programs to help address the
severe and rising problem of unemployment, particularly among young people, may be especially important. The Yemeni bureaucracy is not up to many of
the tasks associated with development since it is both
riddled with internal problems and maintains only a
limited ability to operate outside of Sana’a. This situation greatly magnifies the importance of NGOs.
8. The United States needs to involve Saudi Arabia in efforts to help Yemen, while recognizing that
U.S. and Saudi interests in Yemen will not always
coincide. So long as it remains Yemen’s largest aid donor, Saudi Arabia will always have a great deal to say
about Yemen’s future actions. The Saudis also have
tremendous concern about al-Qaeda activities in Yemen, having endured a terrorist bombing campaign
within their own country which reached its height
around 2004-05. Also, as noted, al-Qaeda forces in Yemen remain interested in striking at Saudi targets to
the extent they are able to do so as indicated by the
nearly successful effort to murder Prince Mohammad
bin Nayef. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia can be seen
to play a negative role to the extent that it funds and
encourages clerics and Islamic organizations that en80

gage in activities which harm Zaydi-Shafei relations.
The United States therefore needs to encourage Saudi
Arabia to follow policies that indicate respect for, or
at least a limited tolerance of, Zaydi Islam. While the
Saudis may not truly feel such respect, they have a
vested interest in preventing the Houthis from turning to Iran as their only regional sympathizer and ally.
Since current tensions between Riyadh and Tehran
are quite high, this is a concern worth repeating and
emphasizing in dialogue with the Saudis.
9. The United States may also want to consider
encouraging other Arab allies beyond Saudi Arabia to take a more active role in helping Yemen,
although such plans will have to be discussed with
both Sana’a and Riyadh in considerable detail. It is,
for example, possible that the Jordanian government
could serve as an increasingly useful ally in supporting Yemen. The Amman leadership detests al-Qaeda
and has a long history of cooperating with Gulf Arab
states in working against the organization. This cooperation includes counterterrorism training at the
King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center
(KASOTC). Additionally, if Iraq is able to bring its
own problems under control to the point that it can
direct serious attention to regional problems, it may
wish to resume military-to-military cooperation with
Yemen in ways that encourage the Yemenis to avoid
total dependency on Riyadh. It is also possible that
Yemeni military forces could benefit from increased
combined exercises with other Arab states and even
peacekeeping training. Again, the role of Jordan could
be useful in teaching Yemen troops how to address
some security problems with minimum force being
directed at the population in conflict areas. While the
Jordanian approach to this issue specializes in interna-
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tional peacekeeping, some of the principles used in an
international environment may be relevant to places
such as Sa’ada province and various trouble spots in
southern Yemen. Jordan maintains a Peacekeeping
Operations Center Based in Zarqa. Since 1989, 61,000
Jordanian troops have participated in peacekeeping
operations in 18 conflict areas, giving them a wealth
of information and experience that Yemen may find
useful.254 Since Jordan is not a wealthy country, funding from the United States, European Union, wealthy
Arab states, or elsewhere would be needed to move
forward on such efforts.
10. The United States must remain aware of potential Iranian activities in Yemen, while bearing in
mind that Yemeni charges of Iranian intervention in
the Houthi rebellion remain unproven and difficult
to evaluate. If the Yemenis have presented any proof
to the United States of Iranian involvement in northern Yemen, they have not done so publicly. Moreover
any secret proof made available to Washington has
remained secret in a way that is unusual in Washington. However, we do not know that Iran is involved.
Tehran could certainly be playing a role in Yemen,
while leaving only the lightest of footprints. In particular, Yemeni rebels do not require weapons transfers
from outsiders like Iran in order to wage war against
the government. Weapons are so widely available in
Yemen that this is probably one of the least effective
strategies for supporting the rebels. Rather, Houthi
insurgents need money to keep their cause alive, and
transfers of funds are more difficult to ascertain or
prove.
11. The United States must not assume that Saudi
de-radicalization programs will work well with Yemeni radicals. It must also accept the fact that the Ye-
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meni de-radicalization programs have turned out to
be failures for reasons related to both funding and national culture. The Saudi system has mostly succeeded
because the former radicals are carefully reintegrated
into society, with good jobs and encouragement to
marry if they have not already done so. The former
radicals are placed under the close supervision of senior members of their families and tribes who will be
held responsible if they return to jihadi activity. This
skillful blend of carrots and sticks means that ex-radicals would have to give up a comfortable life style and
betray their family in order to return to jihadi activities. While some of them do so, many do not. Yemen
is totally unable to recreate this system, and placing
Yemeni jihadis in the Saudi program will not lead to
successful results since the Yemenis will move beyond
the reach of Saudi security forces and the Saudi incentive structure for remaining out of trouble once they
return to Yemen.
12. U.S. officials, including military officials,
must resist all temptations to take public credit for
and celebrate military victories that might occur
against al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. While U.S. support for Yemen is important and must be continued
and accelerated, both the U.S. administration and the
U.S. Government agencies involved in fighting terrorism must not contribute to the misperception that
Washington is running the war. U.S. officials who
openly congratulate themselves about U.S. victories
are hurting the cause they profess to help. Praising the
Yemeni government for these victories will have to be
sufficient.
13. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States
will have to be tolerant of the Yemeni government’s
willingness to pardon and rehabilitate former mem-
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bers of al-Qaeda that have not been involved in international terrorism and show good prospects for
remaining outside of terrorist groups in the future. If
the Yemeni government wishes to pardon them for attacks on the Yemeni military, that is an internal affair
so long as measures are taken to ensure that repentant terrorists never rejoin al-Qaeda or similar groups.
What the Yemenis must not do is pardon terrorists
and then fail to keep track of them or their activities.
Foreign assistance in the use of bio-metric data might
be an option worth considering in these instances.
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